Evasion and time consistency in the taxation of capital income

International Economic Review

Volumn 39, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 461-476

  Boadway, Robin ^a   Keen, Michael ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040679969     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2527302     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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