Corporate fraud and investment distortions in efficient capital markets

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 40, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 144-172

  Kumar, Praveen ^a   Langberg, Nisan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70350179969     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00059.x     Document Type: Article

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