A rational expectations theory of kinks in financial reporting

Accounting Review

Volumn 81, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 811-848

  Guttman, Ilan ^a   Kadan, Ohad ^b   Kandel, Eugene ^c  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33747515292     PISSN: 00014826     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2308/accr.2006.81.4.811     Document Type: Article

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