The nexus between corruption and capital account restrictions

Public Choice

Volumn 140, Issue 1-2, 2009, Pages 245-265

  Dreher, Axel ^a,b,c,d   Siemers, Lars H R ^e  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GÖTTINGEN   (Germany)

^b KOF SWISS ECONOMIC INSTITUTE   (Switzerland)

^c IZA   (Germany)

^d CESIFO   (Germany)

^e RWI LEIBNIZ INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (Germany)

Author keywords

Capital account restrictions; Corruption; Rent seeking; Tax avoidance; Tax evasion

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349902757     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9423-1     Document Type: Article

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