Explaining the rain: The Rise and Decline of Nations after 25 years

Southern Economic Journal

Volumn 74, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 18-33

  Heckelman, Jac C ^a  

^a WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547892196     PISSN: 00384038     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (78)

1. Asselain, J.-C, and C. Morrison. 1983. Economic growth and interest groups: The French experience. In The political economy of growth, edited by D. C. Mueller. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, pp. 157-75.
2. Bernholz, P. 1986. Growth of government, economic growth, and individual freedom. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 142:661-83.
3. Blankart, C. 2001. Popitz law, Bryce's law and government centralization in Prussia and in Germany. Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 19:71-81.
4. Booth, A., J. Melling, and C. Dartmann. 1997. Institutions and economic growth: The politics of productivity in West Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, 1945-1955. Journal of Economic History 57:416-44.
5. Broadberry, S. N. 1988. The impact of world wars on the long run performance of the British economy. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 4:25-37.
6. Cameron, D. 1988. Distributional coalitions and other sources of economic stagnation: On Olson's Rise and Decline of Nations. International Organization 42:561-603.
7. Chan, S. 1987. Growth with equity: A test of Olson's theory for the Asian Pacific Rim countries. Journal of Peace Research 24:135-49.
8. Chan, S. 1989. Income inequality among LDCs: A comparative analysis of alternative perspectives. International Studies Quarterly 33:45-65.
9. Choi, K. 1983. A statistical test of Olson's model. In The political economy of growth, edited by D. C. Mueller. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, pp. 57-78.
10. Coates, D., and J. C. Heckelman. 2003a. Absolute and relative effects of interest groups on the economy. In Collective choice, edited by J. C. Heckelman and D. Coates. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 129-42.
11. Coates, D., and J. C. Heckelman. 2003b. Interest groups and investment: A further test of the Olson hypothesis. Public Choice 117:333-40.
12. Crain, W. M., and K. J. Lee. 1999. Economic growth regressions for the American states: A sensitivity analysis. Economic Inquiry 37:242-57.
13. Demir, F. 2005. Militarization of the market and rent-seeking coalitions in Turkey. Development and Change 36:667-90.
14. Faith, R. L., and N. C. Short. 1995. Bureaucratic tenure and economic performance in centrally planned economies. Public Choice 83:139-57.
15. Garand, J. C. 1992. Changing patterns of relative state economic growth over time: Limitations on cross-sectional tests of Olson's thesis. Western Political Quarterly 45:469-83.
16. Goldsmith, A. A. 1987. Does political stability hinder economic development? Comparative Politics 19:471-80.
17. Gray, V., and D. Lowery. 1988. Interest group politics and economic growth in the U.S. states. American Political Science Review 82:109-31.
18. Green, D. P., and I. Shapiro. 1994. Pathologies of rational choice. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
19. Gustafsson, A. 1986. Rise and decline of nations: Sweden. Scandinavian Political Studies 9:35-50.
20. Heckelman, J. C. 2000. Consistent estimates of the impact of special interest groups on economic growth. Public Choice 104:319-27.
21. Heckelman, J. C., and D. Coates. 2003a. Collective choice: Essays in honor of Mancur Olson. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
22. Heckelman, J. C., and D. Coates. 2003b. On the shoulders of a giant: The legacy of Mancur Olson. In Collective choice: Essays in honor of Mancur Olson, edited by J. C. Heckelman and D. Coates. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 1-13.
23. Heckelman, J. C., and R. Whaples. 2006. Do economists differ from political scientists on public choice? Evidence from a survey. Korean Journal of Public Choice 1:35-41.
24. Hennart, J.-F. 1983. The political economy of comparative growth rates: The case of France. In The political economy of growth, edited by D. C. Mueller. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, pp. 176-202.
25. Hojman, D. E. 2002. The political economy of Chile's fast economic growth: An Olsonian interpretation. Public Choice 111:155-78.
26. James, P. 2003. Developing the Canadian government's bargaining position on the Constitution, June-July 1980: An application of Olson's argument from The Rise and Decline of Nations. In Collective choice, edited by J. C. Heckelman and D. Coates. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 113-27.
27. Kang, S., and J. Meernik. 2005. Civil war destruction and the prospects for economic growth. Journal of Politics 67:88-109.
28. Kirby, M. W. 1992. Institutional rigidities and economic decline: Reflections on the British experience. Economic History Review 45:637-60.
29. Knack, S. 2003. Groups, growth and trust: Cross-country evidence on the Olson and Putnam hypotheses. Public Choice 117:341-55.
30. Knack, S., and P. Keefer. 1997. Does social capital have an economic payoff? A cross-country investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112:1251-88.
31. Koubi, V. 2005. War and economic performance. Journal of Peace Research 42:67-82.
32. Landau, D. L. 1985. Government expenditure and economic growth in the developed countries: 1952-76. Public Choice 47:459-77.
33. Lane, J.-E., and S. Ersson. 1986. Political institutions, public policy and economic growth. Scandinavian Political Studies 9:19-34.
34. Lange, P., and G. Garrett. 1985. The politics of growth: Strategic interaction and economic performance in the advanced industrial democracies, 1974-1980. Journal of Politics 47:792-827.
35. Lehner, F. 1983. Pressure politics and economic growth: Olson's theory and the Swiss experience. In The political economy of growth, edited by D. C. Mueller. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, pp. 203-14.
36. Maitland, I. 1985. Interest groups and economic growth rates. Journal of Politics 47:44-58.
37. Manzetti, L. 1992. The evolution of agricultural interest groups in Argentina. Journal of Latin American Studies 24:585-616.
38. McAloon, J. 2006. Long slow boom? Manufacturing in New Zealand, 1945-70. Australian Economic History Review 46:45-69.
39. McCallum, B., and A. Biais. 1987. Government, special interest groups, and growth. Public Choice 54:3-18.
40. McLean, I. 2000. The divided legacy of Mancur Olson. British Journal of Political Science 30:651-68.
41. Milner, H. 1994. Social democracy and rational choice: The Scandinavian experience and beyond. New York: Routledge.
42. Mueller, D. C. 1983. The political economy of growth. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
43. Mueller, D. C. 2003. Public choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
44. Murrell, P. 1984. An examination of the factors affecting the formation of interest groups in OECD countries. Public Choice 43:151-71.
45. Murrell, P., and M. Olson. 1991. The devolution of centrally planned economies. Journal of Comparative Economics 15:239-65.
46. Nardinelli, C., M. S. Wallace, and J. T. Warner. 1987. Explaining differences in state growth: Catching up versus Olson. Public Choice 52:201-13.
47. Nardinelli, C., M. S. Wallace, and J. T. Warner. 1988. State business cycles and their relationship to the national cycle: Structural and institutional determinants. Southern Economic Journal 54:950-60.
48. Ó Gráda, C., and K. O'Rourke. 1996. Irish economic growth, 1945-88. In Economic growth in Europe since 1945, edited by N. Crafts and G. Toniolo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 388-426.
49. Olson, M. 1962. The economics of strategic bombing in World War II. The Airpower Historian 2:121-7.
50. Olson, M. 1965. The logic of collective action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
51. Olson, M. 1982. The rise and decline of nations. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
52. Olson, M. 1983. The south will fall again: The south as leader and laggard in economic growth. Southern Economic Journal 49:917-32.
53. Olson, M. 1984. Australia in perspective of The Rise and Decline of Nations. Australian Economic Review, Issue 67:7-17.
54. Olson, M. 1986. An appreciation of the tests and criticisms. Scandinavian Political Studies 9:65-80.
55. Olson, M. 1990a. How bright are the northern lights? Some questions about Sweden. Lund: Institute of Economic Research, Lund University.
56. Olson, M. 1990b. The logic of collective action in Soviet-type societies. Journal of Soviet Nationalities 1:8-33.
57. Olson, M. 1992. The hidden path to a successful economy. In The emergence of market economies, edited by C. Clague and G. C. Rausser. New York: Blackwell, pp. 55-75.
58. Olson, M. 1997. An appreciation: Reply to Booth, Melling, and Dartmann. Journal of Economic History 57:445-7.
59. Olson, M., and C. Harris. 1959. Free trade in "corn": A statistical study of the prices and production of wheat in Great Britain from 1873 to 1914. Quarterly Journal of Economics 73:145-68.
60. Orchard, L., and H. Stretton. 1997. Public choice. Cambridge Journal of Economics 21:409-30.
61. Paloheimo, H. 1984. Distributive struggle and economic development in the 1970s in developed capitalist countries. European Journal of Political Research 12:171-90.
62. Paqué, K.-H. 1996. Why the 1950s and not the 1920s? Olsonian and non-Olsonian interpretations of two decades of German economic history. In Economic growth in Europe since 1945, edited by N. Crafts and G. Toniolo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 95-106.
63. Quiggen, J. 1992. Testing the implications of the Olson hypothesis. Economica 59:261-77.
64. Rajan, R. G., and L. Zingales. 2003. The great reversals: The politics of financial development in the twentieth century. Journal of Financial Economics 69:5-50.
65. Rasch, B. E., and R. J. Sorensen. 1986. Organizational behavior and economic growth: A Norwegian perspective. Scandinavian Political Studies 9:51-63.
66. Rosser, J. B. 2007. The rise and decline of Mancur Olson's view of The Rise and Decline of Nations. Southern Economic Journal 14:4-11.
67. Scruggs, L. 2001. The politics of growth revisited. Journal of Politics 63:120-40.
68. Tang, E. W. Y., and A. R. Hedley. 1998. Distributional coalitions, state strength, and economic growth: Toward a comprehensive theory of economic development. Public Choice 96:295-323.
69. van Zanden, L., and A. van Riel. 2004. The strictures of inheritance: The Dutch economy in the nineteenth century. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
70. Vedder, R., and L. Galloway. 1986. Rent seeking, distributional coalitions, taxes, relative prices and growth. Public Choice 51:93-100.
71. Waldow, K. H. 1993. The rise and decline of the saltern: Rent-seeking at its best. Journal of European Economic History 22:581-64.
72. Wallis, J. J., and W. E. Oates. 1988. Does economic sclerosis set in with age? An empirical study of the Olson hypothesis. Kyklos 41:397-417.
73. Weede, E. 1984. Democracy, creeping socialism, and ideological socialism in rent-seeking societies. Public Choice 44:349-66.
74. Weede, E. 1986a. Rent seeking, military participation, and economic performance in LDCs. Journal of Conflict Resolution 30:291-314.
75. Weede, E. 1986b. Sectoral reallocation, distributional coalitions and the welfare-state as determinants of economic-growth rates in industrialized democracies. European Journal of Political Research 14:501-19.
76. Weyland, K. 1996. Obstacles to social reform in Brazil's new democracy. Comparative Politics 29:1-22.
77. Whaples, R. 2003. If I had a hammer: Mancur Olson as an economic historian. In Collective choice, edited by J. C. Heckelman and D. Coates. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 143-61.
78. Whitely, P. F. 1983. The political economy of economic growth. European Journal of Political Research 11:197-213.