Rent-seeking contests with private values and resale

Public Choice

Volumn 138, Issue 3-4, 2009, Pages 409-422

  Sui, Yong ^a  

^a SHANGHAI JIAO TONG UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

Efficiency; Rent seeking contest; Resale

Indexed keywords

EID: 58849139156     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9366-y     Document Type: Article

References (14)

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