Correlated payoffs in the inspection game: Some theory and an application to corruption

Public Choice

Volumn 137, Issue 1-2, 2008, Pages 127-143

  Friehe, Tim ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TÜBINGEN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Corruption; Crime; Incentives; Inspection game; Payoff correlation

Indexed keywords

EID: 50249103270     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9317-7     Document Type: Article

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