Public choice in the new century

Public Choice

Volumn 124, Issue 1-2, 2005, Pages 1-18

  Shughart II, William F ^a   Tollison, Robert D ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI   (United States)

^b Bowling Green State University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 24144497808     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-4740-5     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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