Learning, hubris and corporate serial acquisitions

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 15, Issue 5, 2009, Pages 543-561

  Aktas, Nihat ^a   de Bodt, Eric ^b   Roll, Richard ^c  

^a EMLYON BUSINESS SCHOOL   (France)

^b UNIV LILLE   (France)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Abnormal return; Hubris; Learning; Merger and acquisition; Serial acquisitions

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349866381     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2009.01.006     Document Type: Article

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