The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 62, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 1-25

  Cantillon, Estelle ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ LIBRE DE BRUXELLES   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Asymmetries; Auctions; Benchmark; Bidder heterogeneity; Reduced competition

Indexed keywords

EID: 37849020711     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.11.005     Document Type: Article

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