Defense and attack of complex and dependent systems

Reliability Engineering and System Safety

Volumn 95, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 29-42

  Hausken, Kjell ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF STAVANGER   (Norway)

Author keywords

Attack; Complex infrastructures; Complex systems; Contest success function; Defense; Dependent systems; Game theory; Interdependent systems; Parallel system; Protection; Reliability theory; Series system; Terrorism

Indexed keywords

ATTACK; COMPLEX INFRASTRUCTURES; COMPLEX SYSTEMS; CONTEST SUCCESS FUNCTION; DEFENSE; DEPENDENT SYSTEMS; INTERDEPENDENT SYSTEMS; PARALLEL SYSTEM; PROTECTION; SERIES SYSTEM; TERRORISM;

COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; GAME THEORY; INVESTMENTS; LARGE SCALE SYSTEMS; QUALITY ASSURANCE; TARGETS;

RELIABILITY THEORY;

EID: 70349451957     PISSN: 09518320     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ress.2009.07.006     Document Type: Article

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