Game theory models of intelligent actors in reliability analysis: An overview of the state of the art

International Series in Operations Research and Management Science

Volumn 128, Issue , 2009, Pages 13-31

  Guikema, Seth D ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Game theory; Rationality; Reliability; Risk analysis; Sensitivity analysis; Terrorism; Utility functions

Indexed keywords

EID: 84954529870     PISSN: 08848289     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

References (56)

1. Allais, M., 1953, Le comportement de l’homme rationnel devant le risque: critique des postulats et axiomes de l’ecole americaine, Econometrica 21(4):503-546.
2. Apostolakis, G. E., and Lemon, D. M., 2005, A screening methodology for the identification and ranking of infrastructure vulnerabilities due to terrorism, Risk Analysis 25(2):361-376.
3. Aumann, R. J., 1976, Agreeing to disagree, The Annals of Statistics 4(6):1236-1239.
4. Aumann, R. J., and Hart S., 1992, Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, North-Holland.
5. Azaiez, N., and Bier, V. M., 2007, Optimal resource allocation for security in reliability systems, European Journal of Operational Research 181(2):773-786.
6. Bier, V. M., and Abhichandani, V., 2004, Optimal allocation of resources for defense of simple series and parallel systems from determined adversaries, Risk-Based Decisionmaking in Water Resources X, American Society of Civil Engineers.
7. Bier, V. M., Nagaraj, A., and Abhichandani, V., 2005, Protection of simple series and parallel systems with components of different values, Reliability Engineering and System Safety 87(3):315-323.
8. Blume, L., Brandenburger, A., and Dekel, E., 1991a, Lexicographic probabilities and equilibrium refinements, Econometrica 59 (1):81-98.30 Chapter 2
9. Blume, L., Brandenburger, A., and Dekel, E., 1991b, Lexicographic probabilities and choice under uncertainty, Econometrica 59(1):61-79.
10. Byman, D. L., 2003, Al-Qaeda as an adversary: Do we understand our enemy? World Politics 56(1):139-163.
11. Camerer, C., and Ho, T. H., 1999, Experience-weighted attraction learning in normal form games. Econometrica 67(4):827-874.
12. Chen, H. C., Friedman, J. W., and Thisse, J. F., 1997, Boundedly rational Nash equilibrium: A probabilistic choice approach. Games and Economic Behavior 18(1):32-54.
13. Cooper, H. A., 1973, The terrorist and the victim, Victimology 1:229-239.
14. Crenshaw, M., 1992, Current research on terrorism: The academic perspective. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 15(1):1-11.
15. Crenshaw, M., 2000, The psychology of terrorism: an agenda for the 21st century. Political Psychology 21(2):405-420.
16. Ellsberg, D., 1961, Risk, ambiguity, and the savage axioms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 75(4):643-669.
17. Elster, J., 1985, Sour Grapes, Cambridge University Press.
18. Enders, W., and Sandler, T., 1993, The effectiveness of antiterrorism policies: A vector-autoregression-intervention analysis. The American Political Science Review 87 (4):829-844.
19. Enders, W., and Sandler, T., 1995, Terrorism: Theory and applications. Handbook of Defense Economics 1:213-249.
20. Faria, J. R., 2003, Terror cycles, Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics and Econometrics 7(1):1-11.
21. Frey, B. S., and Luechinger, S., 2002, Terrorism: Deterrence may backfire, European Journal of Political Economy 20(2):590-515.
22. Garrick, J. B., Hall, J. E., McDonald, J. C., O’Toole, T., Probst, P. S., Rindskopf, E., Rosenthal, R., Trivelpiece, A. W., Van Arsdale, L. A., and Zebroski, E. L., 2004, Confronting the risks of terrorism: Making the right decisions. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 86(2):129-176.
23. Hausken, K., 2002, Probabilistic risk analysis and game theory. Risk Analysis 22(1):17-27.
24. Heap, S. P. H., and Varoufakis Y., 1995, Game Theory: A Critical Introduction
25. Routledge Hollis M., 1987, The Cunning of Reason. Cambridge University Press.
26. Hollis, M., 1992, Honour among thieves. Moralische Entscheidung und rationale Wahl, M. Hollis, and W. Vossenkuhl, eds., München: Oldenbourg, pp. 115-130.
27. Juergensmeyer, M., 2003, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, University of California Press.
28. Kadane, J. B., and Larkey, P. D., 1982, Subjective probability and the theory of games. Management Science 28(2):113-120.
29. Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A., 1979, Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 47(2):263-292.
30. Kaplan, A., 1981, The psychodynamics of terrorism, in: Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism, J. M. Gleason, and Y. Alexander, eds., Pergamon, pp. 35-50.
31. Kardes, E., Robust Stochastic Games and Applications to Counter-Terrorism Strategies, 2005, Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events, University of Southern California: Los Angeles, CA.
32. Koller, D., and Milch, B., 2003, Multi-agent influence diagrams for representing and solving games, Games and Economic Behavior 45(1):181-221.
33. Leader, S. H. and Probst, P., 2003, The earth liberation front and environmental terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence 15(4):37-58.
34. Major, J. A., 2002, Advanced techniques for modeling terrorism risk, Journal of Risk Finance 4(1):15-24.
35. March, J. G., 1978, Bounded rationality, ambiguity, and the engineering of choice, The Bell Journal of Economics 9(2):587-608.
36. March, J. G., and Olsen, J. P., 1976, Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations, Universitetsforlaget, Bergen.
37. Michaud, D., and Apostolakis, G. E., 2006, Screening vulnerabilities in water-supply networks. Journal of Infrastructure Systems 12(4):230-242.
38. Osborne, M. J., and Rubinstein, A., 1998, Games with procedurally rational players, The American Economic Review 88(4):834-847.
39. Paté Cornell, E., and Guikema, S., 2002, Probabilistic modeling of terrorist threats: A systems analysis approach to setting priorities among countermeasures, Military Operations Research 7(4):5-20.
40. Post, J. M., 1984, Notes on a psychodynamic theory of terrorist behavior, Terrorism: An International Journal 7(3):241-256.
41. Post, J. M., 1986, Hostilite, conformite, fraternite: the group dynamics of terrorist behavior, International Journal of Group Psychotherapy 36(2):211-24.
42. Rabin, M., 1993, Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics, The American Economic Review 83(5):1281-1302.
43. Rosendorff, B. P., and Sandler, T., 2004, Too much of a good thing? Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(5):657-671.
44. Rosenthal, R. W., 1989, A bounded-rationality approach to the study of noncooperative games, International Journal of Game Theory 18(3):273-292.
45. Rubinstein, A., 1997, Modeling Bounded Rationality, MIT Press.
46. Ruby, C. L., 2002, Are terrorists mentally deranged? Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy 2(1):15-26.
47. Sageman, M., 2004, Understanding Terror Networks, University of Pennsylvania Press.
48. Sandler, T., 2003, Terrorism and game theory, Simulation and Gaming 34(3):319-337.
49. Sandler, T., and Enders, W., 2004, An economic perspective on transnational terrorism, European Journal of Political Economy 20(2):301-316.
50. Sandler, T., and Scott, J. L., 1987, Terrorist success in hostage-taking incidents: An empirical study, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 31(1):35-53.
51. Sandler, T., and Siqueira K., 2006, Global terrorism: Deterrence versus pre-emption.Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue Canadienne d’Economique 39:1370.
52. Sandler, T., Tschirhart, J. T., and Cauley, J., 1983, A theoretical analysis of transnational terrorism, The American Political Science Review 77(1):36-54.
53. Savage L J., 1972, The Foundations of Statistics, Dover.
54. Schbley, A., 2003, Defining religious terrorism: A causal and anthological profile, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26(2):105-134.
55. Udwadia, F., Leitmann, G., and Lambertini, L., 2006, A dynamical model of terrorism, in Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 2006 (85653) doi:10.1155/DDNS/2006/85653.
56. Zhuang, J., and Bier, V. M., 2007, Balancing terrorism and natural disasters-defensivestrategy with endogenous attacker effort, Operations Research 55(5):976-991.