Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 55, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 131-151

  Lebrun, Bernard ^a  

^a YORK UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33644901748     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.01.006     Document Type: Article

References (26)

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