Private monitoring in auctions

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 131, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 179-211

  Blume, Andreas ^a   Heidhues, Paul ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Auctions; Cartels; Repeated games; Tacit collusion; Withholding information

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750014772     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.007     Document Type: Article

References (45)

1. A. Abdulkadiroǧlu, K.-S. Chung, Auction design with tacit collusion, Columbia and Northwestern University Working Paper, 2003.
2. Abreu D., Pearce D., and Stacchetti E. Toward a theory of discounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Econometrica 58 (1990) 1041-1063
3. Aghion P., Bolton P., Harris C., and Jullien B. Optimal learning by experimentation. Rev. Econ. Stud. 58 (1991) 621-654
4. M. Aoyagi, Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication, ISER-University of Osaka Working Paper, 2002.
5. Aoyagi M. Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions. J. Econ. Theory 112 (2003) 79-105
6. Athey S. Single crossing properties and the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games of incomplete information. Econometrica 69 (2001) 861-889
7. Athey S., and Bagwell K. Optimal collusion with private information. RAND J. Econ. 32 (2001) 428-465
8. Athey S., Bagwell K., and Sanchirico C. Collusion and price rigidity. Rev. Econ. Stud. 71 (2004) 317-349
9. P. Bajari, The first-price auction with asymmetric bidders: theory and applications, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Minnesota, 1997.
10. Bajari P. Comparing competition and collusion in procurement auctions: a numerical approach. Econ. Theory 18 (2001) 187-205
11. Baldwin L.H., Marshall R.C., and Richard J.-F. Bidder collusion at forest service timber sales. J. Polit. Economy 105 (1997) 657-699
12. Ben-Porath E., and Kahneman M. Communication in repeated games with private monitoring. J. Econ. Theory 70 (1996) 281-297
13. Bhaskar V., and Obara I. Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring. J. Econ. Theory 102 (2002) 40-69
14. A. Blume, P. Heidhues, Modelling tacit collusion in auctions, University of Pittsburgh and Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) Working Paper, 2002.
15. Blume A., and Heidhues P. All equilibria of the Vickrey auction. J. Econ. Theory 114 (2004) 170-177
16. Cassady Jr. R. Auctions and Auctioneering (1967), University of California Press, Berkeley, CA
17. Y.-K. Che, J. Kim, Collusion-proof implementation of optimal mechanisms, University of Wisconsin and University of Southern California Working Paper, 2004.
18. Dufwenberg M., and Gneezy U. Information disclosure in auctions: an experiment. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 48 (2002) 431-444
19. Ellison G. Cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma with anonymous random matching. Rev. Econ. Stud. 61 (1994) 567-588
20. Ely J.C., and Välimäki J. A robust folk-theorem for the prisoner's dilemma. J. Econ. Theory 102 (2002) 84-105
21. L. Froeb, Auctions and antitrust, Department of Justice Working Paper, 1988.
22. Fudenberg D., Levine D., and Maskin E. The folk theorem with imperfect public information. Econometrica 62 (1994) 997-1039
23. Fudenberg D., and Maskin E. The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information. Econometrica 54 (1986) 533-554
24. Hendricks K., and Porter R.H. An empirical study of an auction with asymmetric information. Amer. Econ. Rev. 78 5 (1993) 865-883
25. Hirshleifer J., and Riley J. The Analysis of Uncertainty and Information (1992), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
26. J. Hörner, J. Jamison, Collusion with (almost) no information, Northwestern University Working Paper, 2004.
27. Jackson M.O., Simon L.K., Swinkels J.M., and Zame W.R. Communication and equilibrium in discontinuous games of incomplete information. Econometrica 70 (2002) 1711-1740
28. J. Jamison, How not to define an equilibrium, Northwestern University Working Paper, 2002.
29. Kandori M. Social norms and community enforcement. Rev. Econ. Stud. 59 (1992) 63-80
30. M. Kandori, I. Obara, Efficiency in repeated games revisited: the role of private strategies, University of Tokyo and University of California-Los Angeles Working Paper, 2003.
31. Kreps D., and Wilson R. Sequential equilibrium. Econometrica 50 (1982) 863-894
32. Lebrun B. First-price auctions in the asymmetric N bidder case. Int. Econ. Rev. 40 (1999) 125-142
33. G.J. Mailath, S.A. Matthews, T. Sekiguchi, Private Strategies in finitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, Contributions to Theoretical Economics 2(1) Article 2 (2002) http://www.bepress.com/bejte/contributions/vol2/iss1/art2
34. R.C. Marshall, L.M. Marx, Bidder collusion, Penn State University and Duke University Working Paper, 2002.
35. E. Maskin, J. Riley, Uniqueness in sealed high bid auctions, Harvard University and University of California at Los Angles Working Paper, 1996.
36. McAfee R.P., and McMillan J. Bidding rings. Amer. Econ. Rev. 82 (1992) 579-599
37. McLennan A. Price dispersion and incomplete learning in the long run. J. Econ. Dynam. Control 7 (1984) 331-347
38. Mirman L.J., Samuelson L., and Urbano A. Monopoly experimentation. Int. Econ. Rev. 34 (1993) 549-563
39. Pesendorfer M. A study of collusion in first-price auctions. Rev. Econ. Stud. 67 (2000) 381-411
40. Porter R., and Zona J.D. Detection of bid rigging in procurement auctions. J. Polit. Economy 101 (1993) 518-538
41. Radner R., Myerson R., and Maskin E. An example of a repeated partnership game with discounting and with uniformly inefficient equilibria. Rev. Econ. Stud. 53 (1986) 59-69
42. Rothschild M. A two-armed bandit theory of market pricing. J. Econ. Theory 9 (1974) 185-202
43. Sekiguchi T. Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring. J. Econ. Theory 76 (1997) 345-361
44. Skrzypacz A., and Hopenhayn H. Tacit collusion in repeated auctions. J. Econ. Theory 114 (2004) 153-169
45. Skrzypacz A., and Hopenhayn H. Corrigendum to 'tacit collusion in repeated auctions'. J. Econ. Theory 114 (2004) 370-371