p-Best response set

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 131, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 45-70

  Tercieux, Olivier ^a  

^a CNRS   (France)

Author keywords

Higher order uncertainty; p dominance; Perfect foresight dynamics; Risk dominance; Set valued concept

Indexed keywords

EID: 33749381683     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.06.001     Document Type: Article

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