Chapter 29 Local public goods and clubs

Handbook of Public Economics

Volumn 4, Issue , 2002, Pages 1997-2042

  Scotchmer, Suzanne ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

capitalization; clubs; externalities; local public goods

Indexed keywords

EID: 67649352519     PISSN: 15734420     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1573-4420(02)80008-8     Document Type: Review

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