Voting with ballots and feet: Existence of equilibrium in a local public good economy

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 68, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 480-509

  Konishi, Hideo ^a  

^a SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030079297     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.0027     Document Type: Article

References (57)

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