Tiebout Economies with Differential Genetic Types and Endogenously Chosen Crowding Characteristics

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 98, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 261-294

  Conley, John P ^a   Wooders, Myrna H ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000155156     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2716     Document Type: Article

References (42)

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