Bargaining between benevolent jurisdictions or when delegation induces inefficiencies

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 65, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 61-74

  Jéhiel, Phillippe ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS EST   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031185063     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(97)00007-8     Document Type: Article

References (9)

1. Boadway, R., 1982. On the method of taxation and the provision of local public goods: comment. American Economic Review 72, 846-851.
2. Coase, R.H., 1960. The problem of Social cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3, 1-44.
3. Jehiel, P., 1992, Five essays in location theory, Ph.D E.H.E.S.S. and E.D.P. (European Doctoral Program).
4. Nash, J.F., 1950. The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 18, 155-162.
5. Oates, W., 1972, Fiscal Federalism, Harcourt Brace, New York.
6. Olson, M., 1965, The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA.
7. Quigley, J.M., Rubinfeld, D.L., 1986, Budget Reform and the Theory of Fiscal Federalism. American Economic Review Proceedings 76, 132-137.
8. Scotchmer, S., 1986. Local Public Goods in an equilibrium: How pecuniary externalities matter?. Regional Science and Urban Economics 16, 463-483.
9. Wildasin, D.E., 1988. Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition. Journal of Public Economics 35, 229-240.