The role of market size in the formation of jurisdictions

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 68, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 83-108

  Casella, A ^a  

^a Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

MARKET CONDITIONS; POLITICAL ECONOMY; POLITICAL REFORM;

EUROPE;

EID: 0035051788     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00161     Document Type: Article

References (42)

1. On the size and number of Countries
2. Acceptable points in general cooperative n-person games
3. Workings of a city: Location, education and production
4. Coalition-proof nash equilibria. I. Concepts
5. A critique of Tiebout's theory of local public expenditures
6. Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
7. The break-up of nations: A political economy analysis
8. A coalition-formation approach to equilibrium federation and trading blocs
9. On market integration and the development of institutions. The case of international commercial arbitration
10. A noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining
11. Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity
12. The division of markets is limited by the extent of liquidity
13. Competitive equilibrium with local public goods
14. Partnerships
15. Strong tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
16. Endogenous formation of coalitions
17. Constitutional rules of exclusion in jurisdiction formation
18. A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
19. Scale economies, product differentiation and the pattern of trade
20. Intraindustry specialization and the gains from trade
21. Cores and clubs
22. Tiebout with politics. Capital tax competition and constitutional choices
23. A noncooperative view of coalition formation and the core
24. Equilibrium binding agreements
25. Endogenous technological change
26. Competitive equilibrium and the core in club economies with anonymous crowding
27. Private good clubs and the core
28. Principles of optimal location in a large homogenous area
29. Regional economies and market integration
30. Trade in a tiebout economy
31. Trade, capital mobility and tax competition
32. Equilibria, the core, and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good
33. A tiebout theorem
34. Equivalence of lindhal equilibria with participation prices and the core