Evolution and equilibrium under inexact informaiton

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 44, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 343-378

  Sandholm, William H ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0043160260     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00026-5     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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