Deterministic evolutionary dynamics: A unifying approach

Journal of Evolutionary Economics

Volumn 6, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 313-324

  Joosten, Reinoud ^a  

^a MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Equilibria; Evolutionary dynamics; Stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030305746     PISSN: 09369937     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF01193636     Document Type: Article

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