Incentive contracts in projects with unforeseeable uncertainty

Production and Operations Management

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 185-196

  Sommer, Svenja C ^a   Loch, Christoph H ^b  

^a HEC PARIS   (France)

^b INSEAD   (France)

Author keywords

Adjustment clause; Incentives; Incomplete contracts; Unforeseeable uncertainty

Indexed keywords

EID: 67549119369     PISSN: 10591478     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1937-5956.2009.01015.x     Document Type: Article

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