Chapter 4 Economics of common property management regimes

Handbook of Environmental Economics

Volumn 1, Issue , 2003, Pages 127-190

  Baland, Jean Marie ^a   Platteau, Jean Philippe ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NAMUR   (Belgium)

Author keywords

co management; commons; H41; inequality; O13; Q20; Q30; regulation

Indexed keywords

EID: 13844259853     PISSN: 15740099     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0099(03)01009-X     Document Type: Chapter

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