Employee discretion and performance pay

Accounting Review

Volumn 84, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 589-612

  Ortega, Jaime ^a  

^a UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

Author keywords

Delegation; Discretion; Performance pay; Piece rate; Specific knowledge

Indexed keywords

EID: 65249149064     PISSN: 00014826     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2308/accr.2009.84.2.589     Document Type: Conference Paper

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