The struggle for the heartland: Hybrid geopolitics in the transcaspian

Geopolitics

Volumn 14, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 1-25

  Labban, Mazen ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARMS TRADE; GEOPOLITICS; HEGEMONY; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; MILITARY INTERVENTION; REGIONAL POLITICS; REGIONAL SECURITY;

ASIA; CASPIAN BASIN; CENTRAL ASIA; EURASIA;

EID: 61549132333     PISSN: 14650045     EISSN: 15573028     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/14650040802578641     Document Type: Article

References (84)

1. See S. Dalby, 'American Security Discourse: The Persistence of Geopolitics', Political Geography Quarterly 9/2 (1990) pp. 171-188.
2. For an extensive and historical treatment, see J. Agnew, Geopolitics: Re-Visioning World Politics (London: Routledge 2003).
3. For more recent examination of Mackinder's influence on US foreign policy, see N. Megoran and S. Sherapova, 'Mackinder's "Heartland": A Help or Hindrance in Understanding Central Asia's International Relations?', Central Asia and the Caucasus 4/34 (2005) pp. 8-20
4. U. Khasanov, 'On modern Geopolitical Pluralism or One-Nation Hegemonism', Central Asia and the Caucasus 4/34 (2005) pp. 29-36
5. C. Seiple, 'Uzbekistan: Civil Society in the Heartland', Orbis 49/ 2 (2005) pp. 245-259. There's an interesting contradiction in Seiple's account: Mackinder's thesis formed the foundation of US foreign policy in the Cold War, yet the US failed to recognise the "geostrategic" significance of Mackinder's thesis until 2001 and has yet to recognise its "geopsychological" component in dealing with the Muslim nations of Central Asia.
6. For an extended discussion, see C. Seiple, 'Revisiting the Geo-Political Thinking of Sir Halford John Mackinder: United States-Uzbekistan relations, 1991-2005' (PhD dissertation, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 2006).
7. For a critique from a different perspective, see N. Megoran, 'Revisiting the "Pivot": The Influence of Halford Mackinder on Analysis of Uzbekistan's International Relations', The Geographical Journal 170/4 (2004) pp. 347-358
8. 'The Politics of Using Mackinder's Geopolitics: The Example of Uzbekistan', Central Asia and the Caucasus 4/34 (2005) pp. 89-102.
9. The domination of "Eurasia's two principle spheres... remains a good definition of strategic danger for America," wrote Kissinger, "Cold War or no Cold War, for such a grouping would have the capacity to outstrip America economically and, in the end, militarily".
10. H. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster 1994) p. 813 (emphasis added). See also Z. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books 1997). Kissinger repeats almost verbatim Walter Rostow's statement on US national security at the height of the Cold War: "It is the American interest that no single power or group of powers hostile or potentially hostile to the United States dominate that area [Eurasia, including Africa and the Middle East] or a sufficient portion of it to threaten the United States or any coalition the United States can build and sustain" (quoted in Dalby (note 1) p. 178). Taking Mackinder to metaphysical proportions, Colin Gray argued more recently that no matter the "identity of the foe", "it is a 'timeless truth' that great peril to the West can come only from Eurasia. The 'grammar' of world physical geography allows for no other assumption."
11. C. S. Gray, 'In Defense of the Heartland: Sir Halford Mackinder and His Critics a Hundred Years On', Comparative Strategy 23/1 (2004) pp. 9-25; quote from p. 21.
12. See the articles collected in the special issues of The Geographical Journal 170/4 (2004)
13. and Central Asia and the Caucasus 4/34 (2005). The collapse of the Soviet Union also unleashed a (paradoxical) interest in Anglo-American geopolitics in Russia, which was condemned during the Soviet era. In very brief terms, Cold War containment and the expansion of NATO since the 1990s are explained in various strains of Russian geopolitical discourse as expressions of a permanent Western drive in accordance with "Anglo-Saxon" geopolitics to weaken Russia's power over the Heartland, if not to establish Western control over it.
14. See A. P. Tsygankov, 'Mastering space in Eurasia: Russia's Geopolitical Thinking after the Soviet Break-Up,' Communist and Post-Communist Studies 36/1 (2003) pp. 101-127
15. E. G. Solovyev, 'Geopolitics in Russia - Science or Vocation?', Communist and Post-Communist Studies 37/1 (2004) pp. 85-96
16. M. Bassin and K. E. Aksenov, 'Mackinder and the Heartland Theory in Post-Soviet Geopolitical Discourse', Geopolitics 11/1 (2006) pp. 99-118.
17. K. Dodds and J. D. Sidaway 2004, 'Halford Mackinder and the "Geographical Pivot of History": A Centennial Retrospective', The Geographical Journal 170/4 (2004) pp. 292-297
18. J. Hyndman, 'Revisiting Mackinder 1904-2004', The Geographical Journal 170/4 (2004) pp. 380-383. Dalby (note 1) provides an interesting dialectic of the relation between explicit geopolitical discourse and US hegemony. He argues that despite the persistence of classical geopolitics, there is no direct reference to Mackinder or Spykman in US security discourse in the post-war period, especially in relation to containment. This "silence" was symptomatic of the implicit hegemonic position and "structuring role" that the discourse on containment enjoyed during this period. Direct references to geopolitics appeared with the decline of US hegemony and with it the policy of containment as a viable basis for US "security".
19. On this reading, the revival of geopolitics in the post-Cold War era could be seen as evidence of the further decline of US hegemony, which is underlined further by the resort to explicit imperialist and colonialist practices. On the simultaneous militarisation of US foreign policy and the decline of its global economic hegemony, see S. Amin, The Liberal Virus: Permanent War and the Americanization of the World (New York: Monthly Review Press 2004)
20. and J. Agnew, Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power (Philadelphia: Temple University Press 2005).
21. f21 See M. Walker, The Cold War: A History (New York: Henry Holt 1993)
22. N. Smith, Endgame of Globalization (London: Routledge 2005).
23. In this respect, Spykman proved more relevant in arguing that the real prize in any rivalry in Eurasia was the Rimland rather than the Heartland. The significance of Central Asia thus lay in its political geographical location rather than any intrinsic physical geographical value (e.g., natural resources or industrial and agricultural potential), the control of which prevented Soviet expansion into the richer territories of Europe and the Middle East. See L. Hekimoglu, 'Whither "Heartland"? Central Asia, Geography and Globalization', Central Asia and the Caucasus 4/34 (2005) pp. 66-80.
24. N. Smith, American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 2003).
25. T. P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons 2004).
26. The Transcaspian region encompasses the former Soviet republics of Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan; Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.
27. The literature on the Caspian in the post-Cold War period is vast. See M. P. Croissant and B. Aras (eds.), Oil and Geopolitics in the Caspian Sea Region (Westport, CT: Praeger 1999)
28. M. P. Amineh, Towards the Control of Oil Resources in the Caspian Region (New York: St. Martin's Press 2000)
29. H. Amirahmadi (ed.), The Caspian Region at a Crossroad: Challenges of a New Frontier of Energy and Development (New York: St. Martin's Press 2000)
30. R. E. Ebel and R. Menon (eds.), Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield 2000)
31. R. H. Dekmejian and H. H. Simonian, Troubled Waters: The Geopolitics of the Caspian Region (London: I. B. Tauris 2001)
32. M. T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: Metropolitan Books 2001)
33. L. Kleveman, The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press 2003).
34. S. L. O'Hara, 'Great Game or Grubby Game? The Struggle for Control of the Caspian', Geopolitics 9/1 (2004) pp. 138-160
35. S. O'Lear, 'Resources and Conflict in the Caspian Sea', Geopolitics 9/1 (2004) pp. 161-186
36. A. N. Stulberg, 'Moving beyond the Great Game: The Geoeconomics of Russia's Influence in the Caspian Energy Bonanza', Geopolitics 10/ 1 (2005) pp. 1-25. Although they differ in interpretation and conclusion, all authors emphasise, and often exaggerate the significance of Caspian hydrocarbon resources and put them at the centre of the competition for geopolitical competition and conflict in the Caspian Basin.
37. See Dekmejian and Simonian (note 10); A. Rasizade, 'The Mythology of Munificent Caspian Bonanza and its Concomitant Pipeline Geopolitics', Central Asian Survey 21/1 (2002) pp. 37-54.
38. BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy (London: BP p.l.c. 2007). The Energy Information Administration gives lower estimates of 30 billion bbl and 60 billion bbl for Kazakhstan and Russia respectively.
39. See R. Ahrend and W. Tompson, 'Caspian Oil in a Global Context', Transition Studies Review 14/1 (2007) pp. 163-187
40. B. Bauer, 'Kazakhstan's Economic Challenges: How to Manage the Oil Boom?', Transition Studies Review 14/1 (2007) pp. 188-194.
41. See G. Smith, 'The Masks of Proteus: Russia, Geopolitical Shift and the New Eurasianism', Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 24/4 (1999) pp. 481-494
42. T. Ambrosio, 'From Balancer to Ally? Russo-American Relations in the Wake of 11 September', Contemporary Security Policy 24/2 (2003) pp. 1-28
43. T. Bukkvoll, 'Putin's Strategic Partnership with the West: The Domestic Politics of Russian Foreign Policy', Comparative Strategy 22/3 (2003) pp. 223-242
44. O. Gladkyy, 'American Foreign Policy and U.S. Relations with Russia and China after 11 September', World Affairs 166/1 (2003) pp. 3-23
45. D. Trenin, 'Southern Watch: Russia's Policy in Central Asia', Journal of International Affairs 56/2 (2003) pp. 119-131
46. R. Allison, 'Strategic Reassertion in Russia's Central Asia Policy', International Affairs 80/2 (2004) pp. 277-293
47. R. Allison, 'Regionalism, Regional Structures and Security Management in Central Asia', International Affairs 80/3 (2004) pp. 463-483
48. P. K. Baev, 'Assessing Russia's Cards: Three Petty Games in Central Asia', Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17/2 (2004) pp. 269-283
49. A. M. Jaffe and R. Soligo, 'Re-Evaluating US Strategic Priorities in the Caspian Region: Balancing Energy Resource Initiatives with Terrorism Containment', Comparative Review of International Affairs 17/2 (2004) pp. 255-268
50. S. N. McFarlane, 'The United States and Regionalism in Central Asia', International Affairs 80/3 (2004) pp. 447-461
51. J. Peroviy, 'From Disengagement to Active Economic Competition: Russia's Return to the South Caucasus and Central Asia', Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 13/1 (2005) pp. 61-86.
52. Of the $90 million budgeted by US government agencies for assistance in Kazakhstan in 2002, $41.6 million were allocated for "security and law enforcement", $13.7 million for "democracy programs", which include anything from the support of political parties, NGOs, to internet access, and $14 million for "market reforms." In all other four Central Asian republics (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) military assistance exceeded assistance for market reform, democracy programmes, and other forms of assistance; only in Tajikistan did the budget for humanitarian assistance exceed that of military assistance. See M. B. Olcott, 'Taking Stock of Central Asia', Journal of International Affairs 56/2 (2003) pp. 3-17; see also Allison (note 14)
53. A. Bohr, 'Regionalism in Central Asia: New Geopolitics, Old Regional Order', International Affairs 80/3 (2004) pp. 485-502.
54. See L. J. Goldstein, 'Making the Most of Central Asian Partnerships', Joint Force Quarterly 31 (Summer 2002) pp. 82-90
55. E. Ahrari, 'The Strategic Future of Central Asia: A View from Washington', Journal of International Affairs 56/2 (2003) pp. 157-166
56. S. E. Cornell, 'The United States and Central Asia: In the Steppes to Stay?', Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17/2 (2004) pp. 239-254.
57. See J. Borawski, 'Partnership for Peace and Beyond', International Affairs 71/2 (1995) pp. 233-246.
58. M. B. Olcott, 'Regional Cooperation in Central Asia and the South Caucasus', in Ebel and Menon (note 10) pp. 123-144.
59. S. Blank, 'American Grand Strategy and the Transcaspian Region', World Affairs 163/2 (2000) pp. 65-79.
60. Some argue that Russia exerts such leverage through sizeable Russian and Russian-speaking populations in Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and especially Kazakhstan. This leverage is enhanced by the defection of opposition and dissident elites to Moscow.
61. Russia threatened the Taliban with airstrikes on targets in Afghanistan should the Taliban lend support to the Islamic rebels in Chechenya or Central Asia. The US appealed to Russia not to attack Afghanistan, ironically two years after the Clinton administration had bombed "suspected terrorist camps" there in 1998, and shortly before the US mounted its own military campaign on Afghanistan under Bush.
62. The Collective Security Treaty Organization is a "collective security system" based on the 1992 Tashkent Collective Security Treaty, and including Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, in addition to Armenia and Belarus. (US-oriented) Uzbekistan and (neutral) Turkmenistan opted out of these security agreements, and the other Central Asian states remained doubtful of Russia's ability to be effective and impartial in its military intervention. Uzbekistan eventually joined in 2006. For Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, the main attraction in the Treaty was the potential sales of military equipment - for Moscow, this promised potential long-term military cooperation.
63. See D. Trenin, 'A Farewell to the Great Game? Prospects for Russian-American Security Cooperation in Central Asia', European Security 12/3-4 (2003) pp. 21-35.
64. See H. J. Wiarda, 'The Politics of European Enlargement: NATO, the EU, and the New U.S.-European Relationship', World Affairs 164/4 (2002) pp. 178-197.
65. See J. Kolko and G. Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper and Row 1972)
66. D. Harvey, 'The Geopolitics of Capitalism' [1985], in Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography (New York: Routledge 2001) pp. 312-344
67. E. Mandel, The Meaning of the Second World War (London: Verso 1986).
68. For a similar, though specifically Mackinder-inspired reading, see S. Sherapova, 'Mackinder's "Heartland" Theory and the Atlantic Community', Central Asia and the Caucasus 4/34 (2005) pp. 103-116.
69. Historically, this term refers to the war of espionage between the Russian and British empires in Central Asia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It has been used in recent years in reference to the geopolitical competition that emerged in the Transcaspian region from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some have expanded the "New Great Game" to include regional hegemons, in addition to the US and Russia, and the multiplicity of forces that reach beyond the region itself. (See R. Menon, 'The New Great Game in Central Asia', Survival 45/ 2 (2003) pp. 187-204).
70. Others have argued that the real new game is between the US and China, with Russia bound to play a secondary role in a Sino-Russian partnership against the US while China will enjoy the longest lasting and broadest impact in Central Asia. (See S. Atal, 'The New Great Game', The National Interest 81 (2005) pp. 101-105
71. J. P. Pham, 'Beijing's Great Game: Understanding Chinese Strategy in Central Eurasia', American Foreign Policy Interests 28/1 (2006) pp. 53-67). Finally, there are those who are critical of the applicability of the concept and the term to the current geopolitical environment, since the Central Asian republics have become independent states that are part of the competition rather than mere "cipher states".
72. Moreover, cooperative relations among the competitors coexist with, and undermine the competition, thus rendering the accuracy of the concept even more problematic (see M. Edwards, 'The New Great Game and the New Great Gamers: Disciples of Kipling and Mackinder', Central Asian Survey 22/1 (2003) pp. 83-102
73. A. Sengupta, '9/11 and Heartland Debate in Central Asia', Central Asia and the Caucasus 4/34 (2005) pp. 8-20
74. I. Torbakov, 'The West, Russia, and China in Central Asia: What Kind of Game is Being Played in the Region?', Transition Studies Review 14/1 (2007) pp. 152-162).
75. See G. Achcar, 'The Strategic Triad: The United States, Russia and China', New Left Review I/228 (March/April 1998) pp. 91-126
76. D. Shambaugh, 'China's Military Views of the World', International Security 24/3 (2000) pp. 52-79
77. O. M. Lee, 'The Impact of the U.S. War on Terrorism upon U.S.-China Relations', Journal of Chinese Political Science 7/1-2 (2002) pp. 71-123
78. G. McCormack, 'Remilitarizing Japan', New Left Review 29 (Sept./ Oct. 2004) pp. 29-45.
79. A more recent joint statement on US unilateral interference and military posture came out of Medvedev's first visit to China, as the new Russian president. See E. Wong and A. Cowell, 'Russia and China Condemn U.S. Missile Shield Plan as Threat to Stability', New York Times, (24 May 2008) p. A8.
80. See B. Lo, 'The Long Sunset of Strategic Partnership: Russia's Evolving China Policy', International Affairs 80/2 (2004) pp. 295-309. Indeed, Pham (note 26) traces China's influence in Central Asia to the fourteenth century, through a mixture of commercial exchange, diplomatic ties, migration of Han Chinese, and military force.
81. Olcott, 'Taking Stock of Central Asia' (note 15).
82. S. Blank, 'India's Rising Profile in Central Asia', Comparative Strategy 22/2 (2003) pp. 139-157.
83. The direct Sino-Indian rivalry has its roots in the war of 1962, followed by stronger ties between China and Pakistan, which pushed India closer to the Soviet Union. Although China has not considered India to be a serious strategic threat, the latter's nuclear tests of 1998 changed Chinese perceptions of the military potentials of India. India perceives China's military ties with Pakistan, Myanmar, and Bangladesh and other smaller countries on the periphery of India as part of a Chinese plan to encircle India, exacerbated by China's development of its maritime capabilities and increased naval activities in the Indian Ocean, especially since much of India's trade is seaborne.
84. China's military budget grew to around $59 billion in 2008, from approximately $50 billion in 2007 and $42 billion in 2006. These are official figure that the Pentagon, chiefly concerned about US military hegemony in Southeast Asia, speculates represent only half the amount of actual military spending.