The long sunset of strategic partnership: Russia's evolving China policy

International Affairs

Volumn 80, Issue 2, 2004, Pages

  Lo, Bobo ^a  

^a Roy Inst of International Affairs   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 11144356441     PISSN: 00205850     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2004.00384.x     Document Type: Review

References (65)

1. Rossiiskie vesti, 25 April 1997, p. 2.
2. Sherman W. Garnett, 'Limited partnership', in Sherman W. Garnett, ed., Rapprochement or rivalry? Russia-China relations in a changing Asia (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), p. 1.
3. Bobo Lo, Vladimir Putin and the evolution of Russian foreign policy (London and Oxford: Royal Institute of International Affairs/Blackwell, 2003), p. 26.
4. Vladimir Putin, cited in 'China-Russia "closer than ever"', BBC news report, 27 May 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/ 2938618.stm.
5. Joint declaration of Putin and Hu Jintao, Moscow, 27 May 2003, http://www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf.
6. I b i d.
7. I b i d.
8. Today's figures for the number of Chinese in the RFE are relatively modest, particularly compared to estimates in the 1990s, some of which went as high as 2 million. 'Based on all the available data, the Chinese population in the Far Eastern district cannot exceed 100,000 people ... One could not find any villages or settlements in the region with a predominant Chinese population'. See Vilya Gelbras, 'Chinese migration to the Russian Far East: a view from Moscow', in Tsuneo Akaha, ed., Human flows across borders in northeast Asia, proceedings of a seminar held at United Nations University, Tokyo, 20-21 Nov. 2002 (Monterey Institute of International Studies, http://www.miis.edu/rcenters- ceas-pub-html), p. 143.
9. Robert Legvold, 'Great power stakes in Central Asia', in Robert Legvold, ed., Thinking strategically: the major powers, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian nexus (Cambridge. MA and London: American Academy of Arts and Sciences/MIT Press, 2003), p. 34.
10. Russian foreign ministry press releases, 'O Rossiisko-kitaiskom torgovo-ekonomicheskim sotrudnichestve', 22 Nov. 2002, http://www.ln.mid.ru/ns- rasia.nsf; 'O razvitii rossiisko-kitaiskogo torgovo-ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva', 30 Jan. 2004, http://www.ln.mid.ru/ns-rasia.nsf.
11. Russian foreign ministry press releases, 'O Rossiisko-kitaiskom torgovo-ekonomicheskim sotrudnichestve', 22 Nov. 2002, http://www.ln.mid.ru/ns- rasia.nsf; 'O razvitii rossiisko-kitaiskogo torgovo-ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva', 30 Jan. 2004, http://www.ln.mid.ru/ns-rasia.nsf.
12. Joint press conference of Vladimir Putin and Hu Jintao in Moscow, 27 May 2003, http://www.ln/mid.ru/bl.nsf.
13. The bulk of 'unregistered trade' comprises transactions by shuttle traders (chelnoki), so called because they criss-cross the border to sell their wares. Unsurprisingly, there is considerable secrecy regarding the level of Russian arms transfers, although most estimates put this at around US$1-1.5 billion per annum - a relatively modest proportion of total bilateral trade.
14. In 2002, for example, Russia exported 3 million tonnes of oil to China: Putin's comments at joint press conference with Hu Jintao, Moscow, 27 May 2003, http://www.ln.mid.ru/bl.nsf. In addition to the Angarsk-Nakhodka oil pipeline project, there are also reasonable prospects of natural gas development in the Kovykta field near Lake Baikal: see 'RUSIA petroleum, CNPC and KOGAS complete Kovykta international feasibility study', Insight TNK-BP, Dec. 2003, p. 6.
15. In 2002, for example, Russia exported 3 million tonnes of oil to China: Putin's comments at joint press conference with Hu Jintao, Moscow, 27 May 2003, http://www.ln.mid.ru/bl.nsf. In addition to the Angarsk-Nakhodka oil pipeline project, there are also reasonable prospects of natural gas development in the Kovykta field near Lake Baikal: see 'RUSIA petroleum, CNPC and KOGAS complete Kovykta international feasibility study', Insight TNK-BP, Dec. 2003, p. 6.
16. As a result of two agreements reached in 1996-7, the five countries adjoining the former Sino-Soviet border - Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan - undertook not to carry out threatening military activity against one another. The agreements imposed ceilings on the number of ground troops and certain types of military equipment permitted in a 100km-wide frontier zone. For a useful summary of the agreements see Jennifer Anderson, The limits of Sino-Russian strategic partnership, Adelphi Paper 315 (London: Oxford University Press/International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997). pp. 40-2.
17. Mikhail Margelov, 'Russian-Chinese relations: at their peak?', International Affairs (Moscow), 49: 6, 2003, p. p1.
18. Dmitri Trenin, Russia's China problem (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), p. 9.
19. As a result of the 'unequal treaties' of Aigun (1858) and Peking (1860), China ceded about 1.5 million sq km of territory, including the present-day regions of Primorye, Khabarovsk, Amur and Birobidzhan.
20. According to Yurii Obriadin, Deputy Presidential Plenipotentiary for the Far Eastern Federal District, the population of the RFE has fallen from 8 million to 6.7 million during the past decade. See 'Population in Far East dropping fast', Pravda.ru website, 13 Nov. 2003, http://newsfromrussia.com/main/ 2003/11/13/51197.html.
21. Putin's comments, cited in Rouben Azizian, 'The optimists have the lead, for now: Russia's China debate', special assessment (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Dec. 2003), p. 6.
22. Dmitri Trenin, The end of Eurasia: Russia on the border between geopolitics and globalization (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2001), p. 218.
23. As one western commentator has put it, 'Russian analysis often treats China as a strategic partner, but rarely as a political or cultural equal': E. Wayne Merry, 'Moscow's retreat and Beijing's rise as regional great power', Problems of Post-Communism 50: 3, May/June 2003, p. 22.
24. This was a common refrain of Chinese diplomats and journalists when the author worked at the Australian embassy in Moscow during the late 1990s.
25. Merry comments that Putin's support for the US post-9/11 'caused genuine consternation in Beijing': see Merry, 'Moscow's retreat', p. 29. The Chinese are also known to have been unhappy with the fait accompli of the Russia-US Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) in May 2002, as well as with Moscow's relaxed attitude towards American abrogation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
26. Rajan Menon and Charles E. Ziegler, 'The balance of power and US foreign policy interests in the Russian Far East', in Judith Thornton and Charles E. Ziegler, eds, Russia's Far East: a region at risk (Seattle and London: National Bureau of Asian Research/University of Washington Press, 2002), p. 39.
27. Trenin, The end of Eurasia, p. 220.
28. See Andrew C. Kuchins, 'Limits of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership', in Andrew C. Kuchins, ed., Russia after the fall (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), pp. 212-13.
29. Trenin, Russia's China problem, p. 33. See also Viktor N. Pavliatenko, 'Russian security in the Asia-Pacific region: the dangers of isolation', in Gilbert Rozman, Mikhail G. Nosov and Koji Watanabe, eds, Russia and East Asia: the 21st century security environment (Armonk, NY and London: EastWest Institute and M. E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 28.
30. Trenin, Russia's China problem, p. 33. See also Viktor N. Pavliatenko, 'Russian security in the Asia-Pacific region: the dangers of isolation', in Gilbert Rozman, Mikhail G. Nosov and Koji Watanabe, eds, Russia and East Asia: the 21st century security environment (Armonk, NY and London: EastWest Institute and M. E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 28.
31. In 2003 Moscow undertook a number of concrete steps to reassert its presence in former Soviet Central Asia, including the formalization of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the establishment of a military base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan.
32. The term 'strategic calculus' does not imply here a logical or even rationalized process, but rather signifies the basket of predispositional influences - rational and irrational, logical and atavistic - that shape Russia's approach to geostrategic and political-military questions.
33. Putin's depiction of Russian foreign policy as multivectored has been much aided by his flexible use of civilizational labelling according to time and place. Thus Russia is European in dealings with Europe, Asian in Asia, transatlantic strategic partner with the United States, and a Muslim nation when participating at the summit of the Organization of Islamic Conference.
34. For example, the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization followed the Russia-US and Russia-NATO summits in May-June 2002. One year later, Hu Jintao's six-day visit to Russia preceded Putin's St Petersburg meetings with George Bush, Tony Blair and EU leaders.
35. It should be emphasized that Putin's interpretation of 'integration' is highly selective. There is a basic unwillingness to accept the loss of sovereignty and freedom of manoeuvre entailed in subordinating national identity to a larger persona. See Lo, Vladimir Putin and the evolution of Russian foreign policy, p. 60.
36. Margelov, 'Russian-Chinese relations', pp. 80, 85.
37. See Denny Roy, 'China's reaction to American predominance', Survival 45: 3, Autumn 2003, p. 74.
38. In fact, Putin emerged relatively unscathed from the Iraq crisis. He was fortunate - or skilful enough - that the Russian position appeared almost invariably to be more accommodating than that of the French and the Germans.
39. Trenin, Russia's China problem, p. 28.
40. See Georgii Bovt and Alexander Chudodeev, 'Obeshschannogo tri goda zhdut', Segodnya, 4 Nov. 1997, p. 4; also Rajan Menon, 'Russo-Japanese relations: implications for Northeast Asian security', in Stephen J. Blank and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, eds, Imperial decline: Russia's changing role in Asia (Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 1997), p. 142.
41. See Georgii Bovt and Alexander Chudodeev, 'Obeshschannogo tri goda zhdut', Segodnya, 4 Nov. 1997, p. 4; also Rajan Menon, 'Russo-Japanese relations: implications for Northeast Asian security', in Stephen J. Blank and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, eds, Imperial decline: Russia's changing role in Asia (Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 1997), p. 142.
42. John Helmer, 'Japan misdirects lobbying for Russian oil', Russia Journal, 8 July 2003, http://www.russiajournal.com/news/cnews-article.shtml.
43. Sergei Pletnev, 'U Putina est shans prevzoiti Khu Tsintao v vostochnoi diplomatii', 26 May 2003, http://www.strana.ru/print/181997.html. Under the Blue Stream project, Moscow and Ankara agreed to transport Russian natural gas to Turkey via the Black Sea. Although it was originally envisaged (in 1997) that the pipeline would eventually deliver 16 billion cubic metres per annum, the Turkish government subsequently used its position as sole customer to pressure the Russians to agree to considerably reduced levels.
44. See Margelov, 'Russian-Chinese relations', p. 87.
45. Ibid., p. 90.
46. Menon and Ziegler, The balance of power', p. 49.
47. Alexei D. Voskressenski, 'Russia's evolving grand strategy toward China', in Garnett, ed., Rapprochement or rivalry?, p. 131.
48. In 2003 a three-year decline in Russian-Japanese trade was reversed, with turnover back to nearly US$5 billion (up from US$4.2 billion in 2002): 'Rossiisko-yaponskie otnosheniya', 28 Jan. 2004, http://www.ln.mid.ru/ns- rasia.nsf. However, this improvement is unimpressive when compared to the burgeoning commercial ties between Russia and China, which, taking into account unregistered trade, are now worth over US$25 billion.
49. Merry, 'Moscow's retreat', p. 29.
50. The vast disparity in nuclear weapons potential is reflected in the fact that Russia is committed by the May 2002 SORT agreement to reducing its strategic weapons stocks to 1.700-2,200 warheads; all this while China has an estimated 20-25 strategic warheads. As for conventional warfare capabilities, few analysts believe that China could launch a successful amphibious operation against Taiwan today, even if the US military were to stand aside.
51. China's purchase of Russian arms makes it dependent on Moscow for spare parts and ammunition, while various commentators have also suggested that Russia tends to sell a better class of weaponry to India. Although the transfer of Russian military technologies to the PLA (People's Liberation Army) means that China will, eventually, be able to make its own weapons, Moscow would still retain substantial inside knowledge, certainly more than would be the case if China were to buy from other sources. See Azizian, 'The optimists have the lead', pp. 6-7.
52. Ideas of strategic 'triangularism' were especially current during the Soviet period. They referred not only to the dynamic between the United States, the Soviet Union and China, but also included at various times the Chinese-Soviet-Japanese, Chinese-Soviet-Indian, Chinese-Soviet-North Korean and Chinese-Soviet-Vietnamese triangles: see Robert Legvold, 'Russia and the strategic quadrangle', in Michael Mandelbaum, ed., The strategic quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan, and the United States in East Asia (Washington DC: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1995), pp. 21-2.
53. Dmitri Trenin, '"Osennii marafon" Vladimira Putina i rozhdenie Rossiiskoi vneshnepoliticheskoi strategii', briefing paper, Carnegie Moscow Center, 15 Nov. 2001, p. 6.
54. See e.g. Robert H. Donaldson and John A. Donaldson, 'The arms trade in Russian-Chinese relations: identity, domestic politics, and geopolitical positioning', International Studies Quarterly 47, 2003, p. 722.
55. Although Hu is some ten years older than Putin, they enjoy a similar reputation for professionalism and dynamism.
56. Vassily Mikheev, 'The strategy of "stability" (on the results of the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China)', LAIR Policy Papers 1: 3, Nov. 2002, Institute for Applied International Research, Moscow, p. 12.
57. Rajan Menon, 'The strategic convergence between Russia and China', Survival 39: 2, Summer 1997, p. 101.
58. Author's interviews in Moscow in October 2003.
59. As related to the author by a senior Chinese government official.
60. Alexander Lomanov, 'Russia's Chinese policy', presentation to a conference, 'Russia in the New World Order', Lessius Hogeschool, Antwerp, 27 Nov. 2003.
61. Bobo Lo, 'Rossiiskaya politika v Vostochnoi Azii: evolyutsiya i preemstvennost', Yaderny Kontrol (Moscow), no. 6, Nov.-Dec. 2002, p. 40.
62. Moscow's unassuming position on participation in the Korean talks was exemplified by Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov's comment that Russia would be happy to take a more active part in the negotiations, 'in whatever form required': press conference in St Petersburg on 1 June 2003, http://www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4. nsf.
63. As Stephen Blank has noted, 'the perceptions of waning power are difficult for Russian leaders, to accept and translate into policy. Russia is disinclined to accept limits on its capability to achieve its perceived vital interests': Stephen J. Blank, 'The United States and Central Asia', in Roy Allison and Lena Jonson, eds, Central Asian security: the new international context (London and Washington DC: Royal Institute of International Affairs/Brookings Institution, 2001), p. 144.
64. Rajan Menon observes that 'the American public's support for protracted embroilment in the tumult of greater Central Asia states is liable to be thin - and without that support, it will be hard to sustain any policy that involves expenditures, setbacks, frustration and the loss of American lives.' Nevertheless, he argues, the strong American emphasis post-9/11 on the war against terror 'is likely to be durable and to dictate engagement': 'The new Great Game in Central Asia', Survival 45: 2, Summer 2003, p. 201.
65. The nadir of Sino-Soviet relations was reached with a series of bloody border clashes on Damansky island on the Ussuri river in March 1969.