More than X is a lot: Pragmatic implicatures of one-sided uncertainty intervals

Social Cognition

Volumn 26, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 379-400

  Teigen, Karl Halvor ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OSLO   (Norway)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 61449253723     PISSN: 0278016X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1521/soco.2008.26.4.379     Document Type: Article

References (36)

1. Alpert, M., & Raiffa, H. (1982). A progress report on the training of probability advisors. In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, & A. Tversky (Eds.), Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases (pp. 294-305). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2. Arkes, H. (1991). Costs and benefits of judgment errors: Implications for debiasing. Psychological Bulletin, 110, 486-498.
3. Buehler, R., Griffin, D., & Ross, M. (1994). Exploring the "planning fallacy": Why people underestimate their task completion times. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 366-381.
4. Chapman, G. B., & Johnson, E. (2002). Incorporating the irrelevant: Anchors in judgments of belief and value. In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, & D. Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment (pp. 120-138). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5. Epley, N., & Gilovich, T. (2001). Putting the adjustment back in the anchoring and adjustment heuristic. Psychological Science, 12, 391-396.
6. Ferreira, M. B., Garcia-Marques, L., Sherman, S. J., & Sherman, J. W. (2006). Automatic and controlled components of judgment and decision making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 797-813.
7. Grice, H. P. (1989). Logic and conversation. In H. P. Grice, Studies in the way of words (pp. 22-40). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
8. Heath, C., Larrick, R. P., & Wu, G. (1999). Goals as reference points. Cognitive Psychology, 38, 79-109.
9. Hsee, C. K. (1996). The evaluability hypothesis: An explanation for preference reversals between joint and separate evaluations of alternatives. Organizatbnal Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 67, 247-257.
10. Juslin, P., Wennerholm, P., & Olsson, H. (1999). Format dependence in subjective probability calibration. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 25, 1038-1052.
11. Kahneman, D. (2003). A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded rationality. American Psychologist, 58, 697-720.
12. Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002). Representativeness revisited: Attribution substitution in intuitive judgment. In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, & D. Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment (pp. 49-81). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
13. Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory. Econometrica, 47, 263-291.
14. Klayman, J., Soll, J. B., Gonzáles-Vallejo, C., & Barlas, S. (1999). Overconfidence: It depends on how, what, and whom you ask. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 79, 216-247.
15. Kühberger, A. (1998). The influence of framing on risky decisions: A meta-analysis. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 75, 23-55.
16. Levin, I. P., Schneider, S. L., & Gaeth, G. J. (1998). All frames are not created equal: A typology and critical analysis of framing effects. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 76, 149-188.
17. Levinson, S. C. (1983). Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
18. McKenzie, C. R. M., & Nelson, J. D. (2003). What a speaker's choice of frame reveals: Reference points, frame selection, and framing effects. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 10, 596-602.
19. McNeil, B. J., Pauker, S. G., Sox, H. C., & Tversky, A. (1986). On the elicitation of preferences for alternative therapies. In H. R. Arkes & K. Hammond (Eds.), Judgment and decision making: An interdisciplinary reader (pp. 386-393). New York: Cambridge University Press.
20. Moxey, L. M., & Sanford, A. J. (2000). Communicating quantities: A review of psycholinguistic evidence of how expressions determine perspectives. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 14, 237-255.
21. Olsen, R. A. (1997). Desirability bias among professional investment managers: Some evidence from experts. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 10, 65-72.
22. Sanford, A. J., Fay, N., Stewart, A., & Moxey, L. (2002). Perspective in statements of quantity, with implications for consumer psychology. Psychological Science, 13, 130-134.
23. Schwarz, N. (1999). Self reports: How the questions shape the answers. American Psychologist, 54, 93-105.
24. Sher, S., & McKenzie, C. R. M. (2006). Information leakage from logically equivalent frames. Cognition, 101, 467-494.
25. Soman, D. (2004). Framing, loss aversion, and mental accounting. In D. J. Koehler & N. Harvey (Eds.), Blackwell handbook of judgment and decision making (pp. 379-398). Oxford: Blackwell.
26. Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2000). Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate. Behavior and Brain Science, 23, 645-726.
27. Soll, J. B., & Klayman, J. (2004). Overconfidence in interval estimates. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 30, 299-314.
28. Teigen, K. H. (2004). When the past becomes history: Effects of temporal order on the explanations of trends. European Journal of Social Psychology, 34, 191-206.
29. Teigen, K. H., Halberg, A. M., & Fostervold, K. I. (2007a). More than, less than, or between: How upper and lower bounds determine subjective interval estimates. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 20, 179-201.
30. Teigen, K. H., Halberg, A. M. & Fostervold, K. I. (2007b). Single-limit estimates as reference points. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 21, 383-406.
31. Teigen, K. H., & Jørgensen, M. (2005). When 90% confidence intervals are 50% certain: On the credibility of credible intervals. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 19, 455-475.
32. Teigen, K. H., & Karevold, K. I. (2005). Looking back versus looking ahead: Framing of time and work at different stages of a project. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 18, 229-246.
33. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185, 1124-1131.
34. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science, 211, 453-458.
35. Wänke, M. (2007). What is said and what is meant: Conversational implicatures in natural conversations, research settings, media and advertising. In K. Fiedler (Ed.), Social communication (pp. 223-256). New York: Psychology Press.
36. Winman, A., Hansson, P., & Juslin, P. (2004). Subjective probability intervals: How to reduce overconfidence by interval evaluation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 30, 1167-1175.