Objective versus subjective indicators of managerial performance

Accounting Review

Volumn 84, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 209-237

  Rajan, Madhav V ^a   Reichelstein, Stefan ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bonus pools; Discretion; Subjective performance measurement

Indexed keywords

EID: 61349143629     PISSN: 00014826     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2308/accr.2009.84.1.209     Document Type: Article

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