Subjective performance indicators and discretionary bonus pools

Journal of Accounting Research

Volumn 44, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 585-618

  Rajan, Madhav V ^a   Reichelstein, Stefan ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745300005     PISSN: 00218456     EISSN: 1475679X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2006.00212.x     Document Type: Article

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