An experimental investigation of employer discretion in employee performance evaluation and compensation

Accounting Review

Volumn 80, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 563-583

  Fisher, Joseph G ^a   Maines, Laureen A ^a   Peffer, Sean A ^b   Sprinkle, Geoffrey B ^a  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY   (United States)

Author keywords

Compensation; Discretion; Double sided moral hazard; Subjective performance evaluation

Indexed keywords

EID: 18944393608     PISSN: 00014826     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2308/accr.2005.80.2.563     Document Type: Article

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