Social optimality and cooperation in nonatomic congestion games

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 114, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 56-87

  Milchtaich, Igal ^a,b  

^a BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

Congestion; Cooperation; Cost sharing; Harsanyi TU value; Nonatomic games; Potential; Social optimality

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346401407     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00106-6     Document Type: Article

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