Players with limited memory

Contributions to Theoretical Economics

Volumn 4, Issue 1, 2004, Pages

  Huck, Steffen ^a   Sarin, Rajiv ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bounded rationality; Games; Maxmin; Memory

Indexed keywords

EID: 14944370876     PISSN: 15345971     EISSN: 15345971     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1109     Document Type: Article

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