Regret-based continuous-time dynamics

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 45, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 375-394

  Hart, Sergiu ^a   Mas Colell, Andreu ^b  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242570460     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00178-7     Document Type: Article

References (15)

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