Dynamic fictitious play, dynamic gradient play, and distributed convergence to nash equilibria

IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control

Volumn 50, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 312-327

  Shamma, Jeff S ^a   Arslan, Gürdal ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b University of Hawaii at Manoa   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; APPROXIMATION THEORY; GAME THEORY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; MATRIX ALGEBRA; ORDINARY DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS; RANDOM PROCESSES; VECTORS;

FICTITIOUS PLAY; NASH EQUILIBRIA; STOCHASTIC APPROXIMATION;

CONTROL THEORY;

EID: 16244381482     PISSN: 00189286     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1109/TAC.2005.843878     Document Type: Article

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