Payoff based dynamics for multi-player weakly acyclic games

Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 3422-3427

  Marden, Jason R ^a   Young, H Peyton ^b,c   Arslan, Gürdal ^d   Shamma, Jeff S ^e  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^d University of Hawaii at Manoa   (United States)

^e GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER SIMULATION; FUNCTIONS; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; NETWORK ROUTING;

MULTI-PLAYER GAMES; STRATEGY ADJUSTMENT; UTILITY FUNCTIONS;

THREE DIMENSIONAL COMPUTER GRAPHICS;

EID: 62749183680     PISSN: 07431546     EISSN: 25762370     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/CDC.2007.4434401     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (27)

1. J. R. Marden, H. P. Young, G. Arslan, and J. S. Shamma, "Payoff based dynamics for multi-player weakly acyclic games," SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 2007, submitted.
2. A. Ganguli, S. Susca, S. Martinez, F. Bullo, and J. Cortes, "On collective motion in sensor networks: sample problems and distributed algorithms," in Proceedings of the 44th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, Seville, Spain, December 2005, pp. 4239-4244.
3. V. Borkar and P. Kumar, "Dynamic Cesaro-Wardrop equilibration in networks," IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 48, no. 3, pp. 382-396, 2003.
4. S. B. Gershwin, Manufacturing Systems Engineering. Prentice-Hall, 1994.
5. D. Fudenberg and D. Levine, The Theory of Learning in Games. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998.
6. S. Hart, "Adaptive heuristics," Econometrica, vol. 73, no. 5, pp. 1401-1430, 2005.
7. H. P. Young, Individual Strategy and Social Structure. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998.
8. _, Strategic Learning and its Limits. Oxford University Press, 2005.
9. D. Foster and H. Young, "Regret testing: Learning to play nash equilibrium without knowing you have an opponent," Theoretical Economics, vol. 1, pp. 341-367, 2006.
10. F. Germano and G. Lugosi, "Global convergence of foster and young's regret testing," Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming.
11. J. R. Marden, G. Arslan, and J. S. Shamma, "Connections between cooperative control and potential games illustrated on the consensus problem," in 2007 European Control Conference (ECC '07), July 2007, to appear.
12. _, "Regret based dynamics: Convergence in weakly acyclic games," in Proceedings of the 2007 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), Honolulu, Hawaii, May 2007, to appear.
13. R. W. Rosenthal, "A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 2, pp. 65-67, 1973.
14. J. R. Marden, G. Arslan, and J. S. Shamma, "Joint strategy fictitious play with inertia for potential games," in Proceedings of the 44th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, December 2005, pp. 6692-6697,
15. submitted to IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control.
16. G. Arslan, J. R. Marden, and J. S. Shamma, "Autonomous vehicle-target assignment: A game theoretical formulation," 2006, http://www.seas.ucla.edu/~shamma.
17. Y. Shoham, R. Powers, and T. Grenager, "If multi-agent learning is the answer, what is the question?" Artificial Intelligence, vol. 171, no. 7, pp. 365-377, 2007.
18. S. Mannor and J. Shamma, "Multi-agent learning for engineers," Artificial Intelligence, vol. 171, no. 7, pp. 417-422, 2007.
19. H. P. Young, "The evolution of conventions," Econometrica, vol. 61, no. 1, pp. 57-84, January 1993.
20. D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.
21. D. Monderer and L. Shapley, "Fictitious play property for games with identical interests," Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 68, pp. 258-265, 1996.
22. J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund, Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
23. J. Weibull, Evolutionary Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995.
24. L. Samuelson, Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997.
25. D. Monderer and L. Shapley, "Potential games," Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 14, pp. 124-143, 1996.
26. W Sandholm, "Evolutionary implementation and congestion pricing," Review of Economic Studies, vol. 69, no. 3, pp. 667-689, 2002.
27. D. Braess, "Uber ein paradoxen der verkehrsplanning," Unternehmensforschung, vol. 12, pp. 258-268, 1968.