A general class of no-regret learning algorithms and game-theoretic equilibria

Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (Subseries of Lecture Notes in Computer Science)

Volumn 2777, Issue , 2003, Pages 2-12

  Greenwald, Amy ^a   Jafari, Amir ^b  

^a Brown Univerity   (United States)

^b BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; CORRELATION METHODS; DECISION MAKING; GAME THEORY; MAPS; MATHEMATICAL TRANSFORMATIONS; STRATEGIC PLANNING; THEOREM PROVING; COMPUTATION THEORY;

DECISION PROBLEMS; EMPIRICAL DISTRIBUTION; EQUILIBRIA; LINEAR MAPS; CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA; EMPIRICAL DISTRIBUTIONS; EXTERNAL REGRETS; GAME-THEORETIC; INTERNAL REGRET; NASH EQUILIBRIA; NO-REGRET LEARNING; SOLUTION CONCEPTS;

LEARNING SYSTEMS; LEARNING ALGORITHMS;

EID: 9444256279     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-45167-9_2     Document Type: Conference Paper

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