Pivots versus signals in elections

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 144, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 744-771

  Meirowitz, Adam ^a   Shotts, Kenneth W ^b  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Elections; Information; Pivot; Signaling; Voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 59749085933     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.08.008     Document Type: Article

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