Are parliamentary systems better?

Comparative Political Studies

Volumn 42, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 327-359

  Gerring, John ^a   Thacker, Strom C ^a   Moreno, Carola ^a  

^a BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Development; Governance; Parliamentarism parliamentary; Presidentialism; Separation of powers

Indexed keywords

EID: 59349085213     PISSN: 00104140     EISSN: 15523829     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0010414008325573     Document Type: Article

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