Separation of powers and development

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 64, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 129-145

  Laffont, Jean Jacques ^a   Meleu, Mathieu ^b  

^a Toulouse School of Economics   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ FÉLIX HOUPHOUËT BOIGNY   (Côte d’Ivoire)

Author keywords

Corruption; Development; Incentives; Separation of powers

Indexed keywords

CORRUPTION; INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK; MODEL; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0035125607     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3878(00)00127-9     Document Type: Article

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