Are all semipresidential regimes the same? A comparison of premier-presidential regimes

Comparative Politics

Volumn 34, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 253-272

  Roper, Steven D ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0040330155     PISSN: 00104159     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/4146953     Document Type: Review

References (58)

1. For an examination of the impact of electoral laws on institutions, see Sharon D. Drumm and Samantha L. Durst, "Power to the Powerless or to the Powerful? The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws in Eastern Europe," paper presented at the annual meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1994; and John T. Ishiyama, "Transitional Electoral Systems in Post-Communist Eastern Europe," Political Science Quarterly, 112 (Spring 1997), 95-115. For an analysis of East European party systems, see Herbert Kitschelt, "The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe," Politics and Society, 20 (March 1992), 7-50; and David M. Olson, "Political Parties and Party Systems in Regime Transformation: Inner Transition in the New Democracies of Central Europe," The American Review of Politics, 14 (May 1993), 619-58. For a discussion of constitutionalism and the judiciary in postcommunist countries, see Sergio Bartole, "Organizing the Judiciary in Central and Eastern Europe," East European Constitutional Review, 7 (Winter 1998), 62-69; A. E. (Dick) Howard, ed., Constitution Making in Eastern Europe (Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1991).
2. For an examination of the impact of electoral laws on institutions, see Sharon D. Drumm and Samantha L. Durst, "Power to the Powerless or to the Powerful? The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws in Eastern Europe," paper presented at the annual meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1994; and John T. Ishiyama, "Transitional Electoral Systems in Post-Communist Eastern Europe," Political Science Quarterly, 112 (Spring 1997), 95-115. For an analysis of East European party systems, see Herbert Kitschelt, "The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe," Politics and Society, 20 (March 1992), 7-50; and David M. Olson, "Political Parties and Party Systems in Regime Transformation: Inner Transition in the New Democracies of Central Europe," The American Review of Politics, 14 (May 1993), 619-58. For a discussion of constitutionalism and the judiciary in postcommunist countries, see Sergio Bartole, "Organizing the Judiciary in Central and Eastern Europe," East European Constitutional Review, 7 (Winter 1998), 62-69; A. E. (Dick) Howard, ed., Constitution Making in Eastern Europe (Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1991).
3. For an examination of the impact of electoral laws on institutions, see Sharon D. Drumm and Samantha L. Durst, "Power to the Powerless or to the Powerful? The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws in Eastern Europe," paper presented at the annual meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1994; and John T. Ishiyama, "Transitional Electoral Systems in Post-Communist Eastern Europe," Political Science Quarterly, 112 (Spring 1997), 95-115. For an analysis of East European party systems, see Herbert Kitschelt, "The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe," Politics and Society, 20 (March 1992), 7-50; and David M. Olson, "Political Parties and Party Systems in Regime Transformation: Inner Transition in the New Democracies of Central Europe," The American Review of Politics, 14 (May 1993), 619-58. For a discussion of constitutionalism and the judiciary in postcommunist countries, see Sergio Bartole, "Organizing the Judiciary in Central and Eastern Europe," East European Constitutional Review, 7 (Winter 1998), 62-69; A. E. (Dick) Howard, ed., Constitution Making in Eastern Europe (Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1991).
4. For an examination of the impact of electoral laws on institutions, see Sharon D. Drumm and Samantha L. Durst, "Power to the Powerless or to the Powerful? The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws in Eastern Europe," paper presented at the annual meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1994; and John T. Ishiyama, "Transitional Electoral Systems in Post-Communist Eastern Europe," Political Science Quarterly, 112 (Spring 1997), 95-115. For an analysis of East European party systems, see Herbert Kitschelt, "The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe," Politics and Society, 20 (March 1992), 7-50; and David M. Olson, "Political Parties and Party Systems in Regime Transformation: Inner Transition in the New Democracies of Central Europe," The American Review of Politics, 14 (May 1993), 619-58. For a discussion of constitutionalism and the judiciary in postcommunist countries, see Sergio Bartole, "Organizing the Judiciary in Central and Eastern Europe," East European Constitutional Review, 7 (Winter 1998), 62-69; A. E. (Dick) Howard, ed., Constitution Making in Eastern Europe (Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1991).
5. For an examination of the impact of electoral laws on institutions, see Sharon D. Drumm and Samantha L. Durst, "Power to the Powerless or to the Powerful? The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws in Eastern Europe," paper presented at the annual meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1994; and John T. Ishiyama, "Transitional Electoral Systems in Post-Communist Eastern Europe," Political Science Quarterly, 112 (Spring 1997), 95-115. For an analysis of East European party systems, see Herbert Kitschelt, "The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe," Politics and Society, 20 (March 1992), 7-50; and David M. Olson, "Political Parties and Party Systems in Regime Transformation: Inner Transition in the New Democracies of Central Europe," The American Review of Politics, 14 (May 1993), 619-58. For a discussion of constitutionalism and the judiciary in postcommunist countries, see Sergio Bartole, "Organizing the Judiciary in Central and Eastern Europe," East European Constitutional Review, 7 (Winter 1998), 62-69; A. E. (Dick) Howard, ed., Constitution Making in Eastern Europe (Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1991).
6. For an examination of the impact of electoral laws on institutions, see Sharon D. Drumm and Samantha L. Durst, "Power to the Powerless or to the Powerful? The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws in Eastern Europe," paper presented at the annual meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1994; and John T. Ishiyama, "Transitional Electoral Systems in Post-Communist Eastern Europe," Political Science Quarterly, 112 (Spring 1997), 95-115. For an analysis of East European party systems, see Herbert Kitschelt, "The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe," Politics and Society, 20 (March 1992), 7-50; and David M. Olson, "Political Parties and Party Systems in Regime Transformation: Inner Transition in the New Democracies of Central Europe," The American Review of Politics, 14 (May 1993), 619-58. For a discussion of constitutionalism and the judiciary in postcommunist countries, see Sergio Bartole, "Organizing the Judiciary in Central and Eastern Europe," East European Constitutional Review, 7 (Winter 1998), 62-69; A. E. (Dick) Howard, ed., Constitution Making in Eastern Europe (Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1991).
7. The literature in this area has grown substantially over the last five years. For a good overview of different methodologies and conclusions, see Thomas F. Remington, ed., Parliaments in Transition: The New Legislative Politics in the Former USSR and Eastern Europe (Boulder: Westview, 1994); David M. Olson and Philip Norton, eds., The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe (London: Frank Cass, 1996) ; Ray Taras, ed., Postcommunist Presidents (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) ; and Timothy Frye, "A Politics of Institutional Choice: Post-Communist Presidencies," Comparative Political Studies, 30 (October 1997), 523-52.
8. The literature in this area has grown substantially over the last five years. For a good overview of different methodologies and conclusions, see Thomas F. Remington, ed., Parliaments in Transition: The New Legislative Politics in the Former USSR and Eastern Europe (Boulder: Westview, 1994); David M. Olson and Philip Norton, eds., The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe (London: Frank Cass, 1996) ; Ray Taras, ed., Postcommunist Presidents (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) ; and Timothy Frye, "A Politics of Institutional Choice: Post-Communist Presidencies," Comparative Political Studies, 30 (October 1997), 523-52.
9. The literature in this area has grown substantially over the last five years. For a good overview of different methodologies and conclusions, see Thomas F. Remington, ed., Parliaments in Transition: The New Legislative Politics in the Former USSR and Eastern Europe (Boulder: Westview, 1994); David M. Olson and Philip Norton, eds., The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe (London: Frank Cass, 1996) ; Ray Taras, ed., Postcommunist Presidents (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) ; and Timothy Frye, "A Politics of Institutional Choice: Post-Communist Presidencies," Comparative Political Studies, 30 (October 1997), 523-52.
10. The literature in this area has grown substantially over the last five years. For a good overview of different methodologies and conclusions, see Thomas F. Remington, ed., Parliaments in Transition: The New Legislative Politics in the Former USSR and Eastern Europe (Boulder: Westview, 1994); David M. Olson and Philip Norton, eds., The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe (London: Frank Cass, 1996) ; Ray Taras, ed., Postcommunist Presidents (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) ; and Timothy Frye, "A Politics of Institutional Choice: Post-Communist Presidencies," Comparative Political Studies, 30 (October 1997), 523-52.
11. Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives, vol. 1 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994) ; Kurt Von Mettenheim, ed., Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics: Comparing Regional and National Contexts (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Robert Elgie, ed., Semi-Presidentialism in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
12. Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives, vol. 1 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994) ; Kurt Von Mettenheim, ed., Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics: Comparing Regional and National Contexts (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Robert Elgie, ed., Semi-Presidentialism in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
13. Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives, vol. 1 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994) ; Kurt Von Mettenheim, ed., Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics: Comparing Regional and National Contexts (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Robert Elgie, ed., Semi-Presidentialism in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
14. While such scholars as Linz and Valenzuela have long argued that regime type has an impact on democratic transition, several recent works have questioned whether this variable is fundamentally important or just one of several variables. Kent Easton, "Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism in the Policy Arena," Comparative Politics, 32 (April 2000), 355-76, is an excellent review of different views. See also Juan J. Linz, "Transitions to Democracy," Washington Quarterly, 1 (Summer 1990), 143-64; Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds., Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) ; and Timothy Power and Mark Gasiorowski, "Institutional Design and Democratic Consolidation in the Third World," Comparative Political Studies, 30 (April 1997), 123-55.
15. While such scholars as Linz and Valenzuela have long argued that regime type has an impact on democratic transition, several recent works have questioned whether this variable is fundamentally important or just one of several variables. Kent Easton, "Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism in the Policy Arena," Comparative Politics, 32 (April 2000), 355-76, is an excellent review of different views. See also Juan J. Linz, "Transitions to Democracy," Washington Quarterly, 1 (Summer 1990), 143-64; Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds., Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) ; and Timothy Power and Mark Gasiorowski, "Institutional Design and Democratic Consolidation in the Third World," Comparative Political Studies, 30 (April 1997), 123-55.
16. While such scholars as Linz and Valenzuela have long argued that regime type has an impact on democratic transition, several recent works have questioned whether this variable is fundamentally important or just one of several variables. Kent Easton, "Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism in the Policy Arena," Comparative Politics, 32 (April 2000), 355-76, is an excellent review of different views. See also Juan J. Linz, "Transitions to Democracy," Washington Quarterly, 1 (Summer 1990), 143-64; Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds., Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) ; and Timothy Power and Mark Gasiorowski, "Institutional Design and Democratic Consolidation in the Third World," Comparative Political Studies, 30 (April 1997), 123-55.
17. While such scholars as Linz and Valenzuela have long argued that regime type has an impact on democratic transition, several recent works have questioned whether this variable is fundamentally important or just one of several variables. Kent Easton, "Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism in the Policy Arena," Comparative Politics, 32 (April 2000), 355-76, is an excellent review of different views. See also Juan J. Linz, "Transitions to Democracy," Washington Quarterly, 1 (Summer 1990), 143-64; Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds., Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) ; and Timothy Power and Mark Gasiorowski, "Institutional Design and Democratic Consolidation in the Third World," Comparative Political Studies, 30 (April 1997), 123-55.
18. While such scholars as Linz and Valenzuela have long argued that regime type has an impact on democratic transition, several recent works have questioned whether this variable is fundamentally important or just one of several variables. Kent Easton, "Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism in the Policy Arena," Comparative Politics, 32 (April 2000), 355-76, is an excellent review of different views. See also Juan J. Linz, "Transitions to Democracy," Washington Quarterly, 1 (Summer 1990), 143-64; Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds., Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) ; and Timothy Power and Mark Gasiorowski, "Institutional Design and Democratic Consolidation in the Third World," Comparative Political Studies, 30 (April 1997), 123-55.
19. Juan J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?" in Linz and Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy, vol. 1; Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism," World Politics, 46 (October 1993), 1-22.
20. Juan J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?" in Linz and Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy, vol. 1; Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism," World Politics, 46 (October 1993), 1-22.
21. Giovanni Sartori is one of the few political scientists to advocate semipresidentialism over presidential and parliamentary regimes. Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes (New York: New York University Press, 1997).
22. Maurice Duverger, "A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government," European Journal of Political Research, 8 (Spring 1980), 52-69.
23. Kaare Strom and Octavio Amorim Neto, "Duverger Revisited: Presidential Power in European Parliamentary Democracies," paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 1999.
24. As this article was being written, the Moldovan parliament voted to amend the constitution to require that the parliament elect the president. This issue is discussed in greater detail below. I did not include Bulgaria and Estonia because, even though both countries popularly elect the president, the office has virtually no constitutional powers. In addition, I did not include Croatia because it has a president-parliamentary regime (the president has the unilateral power to dismiss the prime minister). On that point, Iceland technically should not be considered a premier-presidential regime because the president can dismiss any minister of government. However, because this dismissal power has never been used, most scholars consider the country to have a premier-presidential regime.
25. Sartori, p. 126.
26. Andrew Wilson, "Ukraine: Two Presidents and Their Powers," in Ray Taras, ed., Postcommunist Presidencies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
27. While many scholars have made this point, no one has been as articulate about the relationship between parliamentary party support and presidential power in France as Ezra Suleiman. For a good discussion of this issue, see Ezra N. Suleiman, "Presidentialism and Political Stability in France," in Linz and Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy, vol. 1.
28. Matthew S. Shugart, "Of Presidents and Parliaments," East European Constitutional Review, 3 (Winter 1993), 32.
29. Many of these indices have been developed to assess presidential power in postcommunist countries. See James P. McGregor, "The Presidency in East Central Europe," RFE/RL Research Report, 3 (February 1994), 23-31. In fact, Frye reports that his scale of presidential power is highly correlated (.814) with the scale developed by Shugart and Carey, pp. 525-27.
30. In their analysis of thirty-five countries with a popularly elected president, Shugart and Carey, p. 155 found only twelve countries that did not provide some form of presidential veto.
31. John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds., Executive Decree Authority (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 6.
32. In 1999 the Romanian constitutional court overturned a decision by the parliament to eliminate the president's right to call a referendum.
33. Austrian president Thomas Klestil has been much more active than any of his predecessors.
34. Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984).
35. Stephen Holmes argues that the power of presidents stems as much from nonconstitutional sources as from the constitutions themselves. He explains that this informal power is perfectly normal and not unconstitutional in spirit. Stephen Holmes, "The Postcommunist Presidency," East European Constitutional Review, 2 (Winter 1993), 36-39.
36. Shugart and Carey, p. 149.
37. Sartori, p. 126, believes that, because the Austrian and Icelandic presidents are "strong only on paper," these countries should be considered parliamentary rather than premier-presidential regimes.
38. The Polish president under the "little constitution" of 1992 had substantially more powers than any other East European president. These powers were curtailed in the 1997 constitution. For a discussion of the reasons behind these changes, see Leszek Lech Garlicki, "The Presidency in the New Polish Constitution," East European Constitutional Review, 6 (Spring-Summer 1997), 81-89.
39. Suleiman, p. 146.
40. John T. S. Keeler and Martin A. Schain, "Institutions, Political Poker, and Regime Evolution in France," in Von Mettenheim, ed., pp. 88-90.
41. Elgie's work is one of the few truly comparative examinations of semipresidentialism throughout Europe Articles by such individuals as Frye and Geddes explain the adoption of this regime type in postcommunist countries. See Elgie, p. 18; Frye pp. 528-34; and Barbara Geddes, "Initiation of New Democratic Institutions in Eastern Europe and Latin America," in Arend Lijphart and Carlos Waisman, eds., Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996).
42. Elgie's work is one of the few truly comparative examinations of semipresidentialism throughout Europe Articles by such individuals as Frye and Geddes explain the adoption of this regime type in postcommunist countries. See Elgie, p. 18; Frye pp. 528-34; and Barbara Geddes, "Initiation of New Democratic Institutions in Eastern Europe and Latin America," in Arend Lijphart and Carlos Waisman, eds., Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996).
43. Elgie's work is one of the few truly comparative examinations of semipresidentialism throughout Europe Articles by such individuals as Frye and Geddes explain the adoption of this regime type in postcommunist countries. See Elgie, p. 18; Frye pp. 528-34; and Barbara Geddes, "Initiation of New Democratic Institutions in Eastern Europe and Latin America," in Arend Lijphart and Carlos Waisman, eds., Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996).
44. Easton, p. 358, argues that "it is often difficult to determine whether the policy outcomes identified result from presidential and parliamentary government or from the American and Japanese versions."
45. In examining the case of postwar Italy from 1946 to 1992, Carol Mershon notes that cabinet instability was combined with governing power stability. Although Italy experienced the greatest number of European cabinets, the Christian Democratic Party always held governing power and was able to shape the legislative agenda. Therefore, cabinet instability does not necessarily lead to a paralysis in policymaking. Carol Mershon, "The Costs of Coalition: Coalition Theories and Italian Governments," American Political Science Review, 90 (September 1996), 534-54.
46. Donald L. Horowitz, "Comparing Democratic Systems," Journal of Democracy, 1 (Fall 1990).
47. Holmes, p. 38.
48. Michael Laver and Norman Schofield, Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
49. There is a vast literature that examines the relationship between coalition instability and the structural attributes of the regime. See, for example, Bernard Grofman, "The Comparative Analysis of Coalition Formation and Duration: Distinguishing Between-Country and Within-Country Effects," British Journal of Political Science, 19 (April 1989), 291-302; and Lijphart, p. 60.
50. There is a vast literature that examines the relationship between coalition instability and the structural attributes of the regime. See, for example, Bernard Grofman, "The Comparative Analysis of Coalition Formation and Duration: Distinguishing Between-Country and Within-Country Effects," British Journal of Political Science, 19 (April 1989), 291-302; and Lijphart, p. 60.
51. Bert A. Rockman, and R. Kent Weaver, eds., Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1993); George Tsebelis, "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, Multipartyism," British Journal of Political Science, 25 (July 1995), 289-325.
52. Bert A. Rockman, and R. Kent Weaver, eds., Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1993); George Tsebelis, "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, Multipartyism," British Journal of Political Science, 25 (July 1995), 289-325.
53. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are obvious exceptions.
54. In 1999 alone he nominated four individuals to become prime minister.
55. A consultative referendum elicits the opinion of the public and has no legal ramifications. Lucinschi hoped to use the outcome of this referendum to put pressure on the parliament either to call for a binding referendum or to pass a constitutional amendment.
56. Because the Moldovan president would still nominate a prime minister subject to a vote of confidence, the proposed change was actually a president-parliamentary regime.
57. Infotag, Mar. 22, 1999.
58. Infotag, July 5, 2000.