Linkage diplomacy: Economic and security bargaining in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-23

International Security

Volumn 33, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 143-179

  Davis, Christina L ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 59249099683     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.2009.33.3.143     Document Type: Review

References (175)

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19. For notable exceptions, see Papayoanou, Power Ties;
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24. On capital flows, see Erik Gartzke, Quan Li, and Charles Boehmer, "Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict," International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 2 (April 2001), pp. 391-438.
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26. Long and Leeds, "Trading for Security."
27. For reviews of this extensive literature, see Katherine Barbieri, The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade. Promote Peace? (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002);
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29. Gowa, Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade;
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34. Polachek, "Conflict and Trade"; and Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace.
35. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977);
36. Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer, "Investing in the Peace"; and James Morrow, "How Could Trade Affect Conflict?" Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July 1999), pp. 267-293.
37. Papayoanou, "Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of Power."
38. Paul A. Papayoanou and Scott L. Kastner, "Sleeping with the (Potential) Enemy: Assessing the U.S. Policy of Engagement with China," Security Studies, Vol. 9, Nos. 1-2 (Autumn 1999/2000), pp. 157-187.
39. Long and Leeds, "Trading for Security," p. 439.
40. Polachek, "Conflict and Trade"; Mark J. Gasiorowski, "Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: Some Crossnational Evidence," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 1 (March 1986), pp. 23-38;
41. Edward D. Mansfield, Power, Trade, and War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994);
42. Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence"; and Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer, "Investing in the Peace."
43. Contrary to Gowa, Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson and Tressa E. Tabares find that alliances do not have a significant effect. Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares, "The Political Determinants of International Trade: The Major Powers, 1907-90," American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 649-661. In "Alliances, Imperfect Markets, and Major-Power Trade," Gowa and Mansfield dispute their finding and show that alliances increase trade. In "Trade Still Follows the Flag," Keshk, Pollins, and Reuveny find mixed effects of alliances depending on data set and model specification.
44. James D. Morrow, "When Do 'Relative Gains' Impede Trade?" Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 1 (February 1997), pp. 12-37.
45. Long and Leeds, "Trading for Security."
46. See Liberman, "Trading with the Enemy"; and Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War."
47. Kevin Narizny, "The Political Economy of Alignment: Great Britain's Commitments to Europe, 1905-39," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), pp. 184-219;
48. and Kevin Narizny, The Political Economy of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2007).
49. Etel Solingen, Regional Orders at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998);
50. Papayoanou and Kastner, "Sleeping with the (Potential) Enemy";
51. and Miles Kahler and Scott L. Kastner, "Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 43, No. 5 (September 2006), pp. 523-541.
52. David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985).
53. R. Harrison Wagner, "Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power, and Political Influence," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 461-483;
54. Robert D. Tollison and Thomas D. Willett, "An Economic Theory of Mutually Advantageous Issue Linkages in International Negotiations," International Organization, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Autumn 1979), pp. 425-449;
55. and Christina L. Davis, "International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization," American Political Science Review, Vol. 98, No. 1 (February 2004), pp. 153-169.
56. Skalnes, Politics, Markets, and Grand Strategy.
57. Gowa, Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade;
58. and Mansfield and Bronson, "Alliances, Preferential Trading Arrangements, and International Trade."
59. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade.
60. Simmons, "Pax Mercatoria and the Theory of the State," p. 36.
61. Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986);
62. and Fiona McGillivray, Privileging Industry: The Comparative Politics of Trade and Industrial Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004).
63. Michael Hiscox, High Stakes: The Political Economy of U.S. Trade Sanctions, 1950-2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming);
64. and Papayoanou and Kastner, "Sleeping with the (Potential) Enemy."
65. Michael J. Gilligan, Empowering Exporters: Reciprocity, Delegation, and Collective Action in American Trade Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997);
66. and Davis, "International Institutions and Issue Linkage."
67. Joanne Gowa, "Politics at the Water's Edge: Parties, Voters, and the Use of Force Abroad," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 2 (April 1998), pp. 307-324.
68. Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn O'Halloran, "Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Autumn 1994), pp. 595-632;
69. McGillivray, Privileging Industry;
70. and Lawrence Broz, "Congressional Politics of International Financial Rescues," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49, No. 3 (July 2005), pp. 479-496.
71. Narizny, "The Political Economy of Alignment";
72. and Narizny, The Political Economy of Grand Strategy.
73. Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), p. 114.
74. Quoted in ibid., p. 161.
75. Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988).
76. Ian H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907 (London: Athlone, 1966), pp. 8-10.
77. Friedberg, The Weary Titan, p. 107.
78. Lord Selborne, memo, September 4, 1901, quoted in Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 174.
79. Alfred L.P. Dennis, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1923), p. 34.
80. They did not discuss a formal alliance, but rather an agreement of shared interests.
81. Chung-Fu Chang, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1931), p. 40.
82. Ibid., p. 77.
83. Malcolm Pearce and Geoffrey Stewart, British Political History, 1867-2001: Democracy and Decline, 3d ed. (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 99.
84. Narizny, The Political Economy of Grand Strategy, pp. 160, 185.
85. Frank Goodman Williston, "The End of British Isolation: The Origins of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance," Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1935, pp. 40, 49-50.
86. Arthur Redford, Manchester Merchants and Foreign Trade, Vol. 2: 1850-1939 (Manchester, U.K: Manchester University Press, 1956), p. 99.
87. R.P. Dua, Anglo-Japanese Relations during the First World War (New Delhi: S. Chand, 1972), pp. 436-437.
88. Aggregate trade volume between Japan and the British Empire rose from 45 million yen in 1893 to 121 million yen in 1900. Brian R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Africa, Asia, and Oceana, 1750-2000 (New York: New York University Press, 1982), p. 436.
89. Shigeru Kurobane, Nichiei dōmei no kiseki [The course of the Anglo-Japanese alliance] (Tokyo: Bunka shobo, 1987), p. 97.
90. Ibid., p. 384.
91. Yuichi Inouye, Higashi Ajia tetsudō kokusai kankei shi [Railway diplomacy in East Asia] (Tokyo: Keio University Press, 1989).
92. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 225.
93. Shigeru Kurobane, "Nichiei dōmei no seiritsu to kokka zaisei mondai" [The Anglo-Japanese alliance and the national finances problem], Rekishi Kyoiku, Vol. 5 (1957), pp. 13-19, 50-59.
94. Ian H. Nish, Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23 (London: Athlone, 1972), p. 10.
95. Dennis, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 99. The endorsement of an Open Door policy nominally called for support of Chinese sovereignty and equal access to China's markets for all states, but quickly devolved into both Japan and Britain insisting on their rights within respective spheres of influence.
96. Ibid., p. 183.
97. Shigeru Murashima, The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, Vol. 1 : The Political-Diplomatic Dimension, 1600-1930 (London: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 159-196.
98. "Nichiei dōmei to shyokogyo no eikyo" [The Anglo-Japanese alliance effect on commerce], Taiyo, March 5, 1902, in Nichiei dōmei to nihon no masumedeia (Tokyo: Keio University, 2002).
99. Kurobane, Nichiei dōmei no kiseki, p. 96.
100. Japan Defense Agency (JDA), Nichiei dōmei gunjiteki kosatsu [A military assessment of the Anglo-Japanese alliance], Technical Report (Tokyo: Japanese Defense Agency Research Institute, 1975), p. 15.
101. See statement by Sir John Fisher, quoted in Friedberg, The Weary Titan, p. 199.
102. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 254.
103. Ibid.
104. Frederick Warner, Anglo-Japanese Financial Relations: A Golden Tide (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), p. 54.
105. Ibid., p. 53.
106. Kurobane, Nichiei dōmei no kiseki, pp. 101-102.
107. Janet E. Hunter and S. Sugiyama, "Anglo-Japanese Economic Relations in Historical Perspective, 1600-2000: Trade and Industry, Finance, Technology, and Industrial Challenge," in Hunter and Sugiyama, eds., The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000, Vol. 4: Economic and Business Relations (New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 1-109, at p. 42.
108. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 255.
109. Williston, "The End of British Isolation," p. 240.
110. Friedberg, The Weary Titan, p. 267.
111. Shigeru Kurobane, Nichiei dōmei no kenkyū [Research on the Anglo-Japanese alliance] (Sendai, Japan: Tōhoku Kyoiku Tosho, 1968), pp. 201, 330.
112. Ian Gow, "The Royal Navy and Japan, 1900-1920: Strategic Re-evaluation of the IJN," in Gow, Yoichi Hirama, and John Chapman, eds., The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, Vol. 3: The Military Dimension, 1800-2000 (Hampshire, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 42.
113. Marius B. Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 439.
114. JDA, Nichiei dōmei gunjiteki kosatsu, p. 67.
115. Pearce and Stewart, British Political History, p. 282.
116. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 353.
117. Friedberg, The Weary Titan, p. 299.
118. Dennis, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, pp. 28-29.
119. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 357.
120. Hunter and Sugiyama, "Anglo-Japanese Economic Relations in Historical Perspective," p. 53.
121. Dua, Anglo-Japanese Relations during the First World War, pp. 86-87.
122. Morinosuke Kajima, The Diplomacy of Japan, 1894-1922, Vol. 2: Anglo-Japanese Alliance and Russo-Japanese War (Tokyo: Kajima Institute of International Peace), p. 457.
123. Chang, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 140.
124. Ibid., p. 146.
125. Friedberg, The Weary Titan, p. 85.
126. Redford, Manchester Merchants and Foreign Trade, p. 87.
127. Williston, "The End of British Isolation," p. 42.
128. Nish, Alliance in Decline, p. 18.
129. Ibid., p. 31;
130. and Chang, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 143.
131. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 31.
132. Peter Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, 1911-15: A Study of British Far Eastern Policy (London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 19.
133. Ibid., pp. 124-125.
134. Ibid., p. 136.
135. Narizny, "The Political Economy of Alignment," p. 192.
136. Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, p. 131.
137. Foreign Office, 371/922142913], memorandum of a conference held on November 16, 1910.
138. Foreign Office, 371/921 [26060], minutes of meeting on Japanese Tariff and Commercial Treaty Negotiations, July 8, 1910.
139. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th ser., Vol. 17 (1910), cols. 5-6.
140. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th ser., Vol. 19 (1910), col. 1459.
141. Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 17 (1910), cols. 5-6, 29.
142. Martin Pugh, The Making of Modern British Politics, 1867-1945, 3d ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), p. 131.
143. Foreign Office, 371/921 [26060], minutes of meeting, July 8, 1910.
144. Redford, Manchester Merchants and Foreign Trade, p. 83.
145. "The New Japanese Tariff," Times, May 26, 1910.
146. Duncan G. Law, "The Japanese Tariff," Times, June 17, 1910.
147. Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, p. 21.
148. Foreign Office, 371/921 [11362], C. MacDonald to Edward Grey, March 18, 1910.
149. Foreign Office, 371/921123678], Edward Grey to C. MacDonald, June 28, 1910.
150. Austen Chamberlain, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th ser., Vol. 21 (1911), cols. 295-296.
151. Foreign Office, 371/921 [26094], Board of Trade to Japanese ambassador, July 15, 1910.
152. Foreign Office, 371/921 [11362], C. MacDonald to Edward Grey, March 18, 1910.
153. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho [Japan's foreign policy documents], Vol. 43, No. 1, p. 661.
154. Foreign Office, 371/922 [39117], C. MacDonald to Edward Grey, October 9, 1910.
155. Ibid.
156. Foreign Office, 371/922 [42913], memorandum of a conference.
157. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, p. 59.
158. Foreign Office, 371/1137[2323], Edward Grey to C. MacDonald, January 16, 1911.
159. "The Anglo-Japanese Treaty," Times, April 6, 1911.
160. "London Chamber of Commerce: Mr. Buxton and the Japanese Commercial Treaty," Times, April 29, 1911, p. 8.
161. Redford, Manchester Merchants and Foreign Trade, pp. 83-84.
162. Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, p. 25.
163. Ibid., p. 274.
164. Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, p. 30.
165. JDA, Nichiei dōmei gunjiteki kosatsu.
166. Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, p. 180.
167. Gow, "The Royal Navy and Japan," p. 45.
168. Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, p. 249.
169. Ibid., p. 244.
170. Chihiro Hosoya, "Britain and the U.S. in Japan's View, 1919-37," in Ian Nish, ed., Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 1919-1952: Papers of the Anglo-Japanese Conference on the History of the Second World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 3-26, at pp. 7-8.
171. Kurobane, Nichiei dōmei no kenkyū, p. 549.
172. Quoted in Dua, Anglo-Japanese Relations during the First World War, p. 209.
173. Papayoanou, "Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of Power."
174. Thomas Moll extends the framework of this article and finds that domestic pressure accounts for the form of side payments and bargaining leverage in the U.S.-Japan relationship. Moll, "The Role of Domestic Politics in Shaping International Linkages between Economics and Security: The U.S.-Japanese Alliance, 1951-1991," master's thesis, London School of Economics, 2007.
175. William C. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse, "Presidents, Congress, and the Use of Force," International Organization, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Winter 2005), pp. 209-232. How do states use economic-security linkages in international bargaining? Governments can provide economic benefits as a side payment to reinforce security cooperation and use close security ties as a source of bargaining leverage in economic negotiations. Domestic political pressures, however, may constrain the form of linkage. First, economic side payments are more likely to be chosen in areas that will not harm the key interests of the ruling party. Second, involvement by the legislature pushes governments toward using security ties as bargaining leverage for economic gains. Evidence from negotiations between Britain and Japan during the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 to 1923 supports the constraining role of domestic politics. Economic-security linkages occurred as Britain gave favorable economic treatment to Japan in order to strengthen the alliance. Economic competition between the allies, however, made it difficult for Britain to grant asymmetrical economic benefits. In tariff negotiations where business interests had more influence in the domestic policy process, the alliance was used as leverage to force reciprocity.