Crowding games are sequentially solvable

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 27, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 501-509

  Milchtaich, Igal ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Congestion games; Crowding games; Pure strategy equilibria; Sequential solvability

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039494829     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820050086     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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