Network structure and strong equilibrium in route selection games

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 46, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 193-205

  Holzman, Ron ^a   Law yone, Nissan ^a,b  

^a TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

^b WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE   (Israel)

Author keywords

Efficiency; Nash equilibrium; Network; Route selection game; Strong equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 0141465204     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00076-3     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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