Aggregation of expert opinions

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 65, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 339-371

  Gerardi, Dino ^a   McLean, Richard ^b   Postlewaite, Andrew ^c  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Center for Children and Childhood Studies   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 59249083190     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.010     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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