Informational size and incentive compatibility

Econometrica

Volumn 70, Issue 6, 2002, Pages 2421-2453

  McLean, Richard ^a   Postlewaite, Andrew ^b  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Incentive compatibility; Incomplete information; Mechanism design

Indexed keywords

APPROXIMATION THEORY; COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; GAME THEORY; INFORMATION THEORY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; PARETO PRINCIPLE; PROBLEM SOLVING; THEOREM PROVING;

INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY;

INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS;

EID: 0036436530     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00380     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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