The price of optimum in Stackelberg games on arbitrary single commodity networks and latency functions

Theoretical Computer Science

Volumn 410, Issue 8-10, 2009, Pages 745-755

  Kaporis, A C ^a   Spirakis, P G ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PATRAS   (Greece)

^b University of Patras and Computer Technology Institute   (Greece)

Author keywords

Coordination ratio; Price of optimum; Stackelberg

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; COMPUTERS; FUNCTIONS; GAME THEORY; MARINE BIOLOGY; OPTIMIZATION; PROBABILITY DENSITY FUNCTION; PROGRAMMING THEORY; SCHEDULING;

BRAESS'S PARADOXES; COORDINATION RATIO; INFINITE NUMBERS; LATENCY FUNCTIONS; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; NP-HARD; OPTIMAL STRATEGIES; PARALLEL LINKS; PRICE OF OPTIMUM; SCHEDULING STRATEGIES; SELFISH ROUTING; SELFISH USERS; STACKELBERG; STACKELBERG GAMES;

COSTS;

EID: 59049088857     PISSN: 03043975     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.tcs.2008.11.002     Document Type: Article

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