Do shareholders vote strategically? Voting behavior, proposal screening, and majority rules

Review of Finance

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 47-79

  Maug, Ernst ^a   Rydqvist, Kristian ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

^b BINGHAMTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 58449134598     PISSN: 15723097     EISSN: 1573692X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rof/rfn026     Document Type: Article

References (33)

1. Aghion, P. and Bolton, P. (2003) Incomplete Social Contracts, Journal of the European Economic Association 1, 38-67.
2. Austen-Smith, D. and Banks, J. S. (1996) Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem, American Political Science Review 90, 34-45.
3. Austen-Smith, D. and Feddersen, T. J. (2006) Deliberation, Preference Uncertainty, and Voting Rules, American Political Science Review 100, 209-217.
4. Battaglini, M., Morton, R., and Palfrey, T. R. (2006) The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory, unpublished working paper, SSRN.
5. Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., and Ferrell, A. (2005) What Matters in Corporate Governance?, unpublished working paper, SSRN.
6. Berle, A. A. and Means, G.C. (1932) The Modern Corporation and Private Property, MacMillan, New York.
7. Bethel, J.E. and Gillan, S. L. (2002) The Impact of the Institutional and Regulatory Environment on Shareholder Voting, Financial Management 31, 29-54.
8. Brickley, J. A., Lease, R. C., and Smith Jr., C. W. (1988) Ownership Structure and Voting on Antitakeover Amendments, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 267-291.
9. Brickley, J. A., Lease, R. C., and Smith Jr., C. W. 1994, Corporate Voting: Evidence from Charter Amendment Proposals, Journal of Corporate Finance 1, 5-31.
10. Burch, T. R., Morgan, A. G., and Wolf, J. G. (2004) Is Acquiring-Firm Shareholder Approval in Stock-for-Stock Merger Perfunctory?, Financial Management 33, 45-69.
11. Campbell, C. J., Gillan, S.L., and Niden, C. M. (1999) Current Perspectives on Shareholder Proposals: Lessons From the 1997 Proxy Season, Financial Management 28, 89-98.
12. Coughlan, P. J. (2000) In Defense of Unanimous Jury Verdicts: Mistrials, Communication, and Strategic Voting, American Political Science Review 94, 375-393.
13. Davis, G. F. and Kim, E. H. (2007) Would Mutual Funds Bite the Hand That Feeds Them? Business Ties and Proxy Voting, Journal of Financial Economics 85, 552-570.
14. DeAngelo, H. and Rice, E. M. (1983) Antitakeover Charter Amendments and Stockholder Wealth, Journal of Financial Economics 11, 329-360.
15. Dekel, E. and Piccione, M. (2000) Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elections, Journal of Political Economy 108, 34-55.
16. Easterbrook, F. H. and Fischel, D. R. (1983) Voting in Corporate Law, Journal of Law and Economics 26, 395-427.
17. Feddersen, T. J. and Pesendorfer, W. (1996) The Swing Voter's Curse, American Economic Review 86, 408-424.
18. Feddersen, T. J. and Pesendorfer, W (1997) Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information, Econometrica 65, 1029-1059.
19. Feddersen, T. J. and Pesendorfer, W. (1998) Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts, American Political Science Review 92, 23-35.
20. Gompers, P., Ishii, J., and Metrick, A. (2003) Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, 107-155.
21. Grossman, S. J. and Hart, O. D. (1988) One-Share-One-Vote and the Market for Corporate Control, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 175-202.
22. Guarnaschelli, S., McKelvey, R. D., and Palfrey, T. R. (2000) An Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules, American Political Science Review 94, 407-423.
23. Holden, R. (2004) Supermajority Voting Rules, unpublished working paper, SSRN.
24. Jarrell, G. A. and Poulsen, A. B. (1987) Shark Repellents and Stock Prices-The Effects of Antitakeover Amendments Since 1980, Journal of Financial Economics 19, 127-168.
25. Matvos, G. and Ostrovsky, M. (2006) Strategic Proxy Voting, unpublished working paper, Stanford University.
26. Maug, E. (1999) How Effective is Proxy Voting? Information Aggregation and Conflict Resolution in Corporate Voting Contests, unpublished working paper, SSRN.
27. Maug, E. and Yilmaz, B. (2002) Two-Class Voting: A Mechanism for Conflict Resolution? American Economic Review 92, 1448-1471.
28. Morgan, A. G. and Poulsen, A. B. (2001) Linking Pay to Performance - Compensation Proposals in the S&P500, Journal of Financial Economics 62, 489-523.
29. Persico, N. (2004) Committee Design with Endogenous Information, Review of Economic Studies 71, 165-194.
30. Pound, J. (1988) Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 237-266.
31. Prevost, A. K. and Rao, R. P. (2000) Of What Value Are Shareholders Proposals Sponsored by Public Pension Funds?, Journal of Business 73, 177-204.
32. Woidtke, T. (2002) Agents Watching Agents?; Evidence From Pension Fund Ownership and Firm Value, Journal of Financial Economics 63, 99-131.
33. Young, P. J., Millar, J. A., and Glezen, G. W. (1993) Trading Volume, Management Solicitation, and Shareholder Voting, Journal of Financial Economics 33, 57-71.