The mental element in the rome statute of the international criminal court: A commentary from A comparative criminal law perspective

Criminal Law Forum

Volumn 19, Issue 3-4, 2008, Pages 473-518

  Badar, Mohamed Elewa ^a  

^a Elliott Jaques Building   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 58049098681     PISSN: 10468374     EISSN: 15729850     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10609-008-9085-6     Document Type: Article

References (260)

1. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-803, Décision sur la confirmation des charges, (Lubanga Décision sur la confirmation des charges), 29 January 2007.
2. Ibid.
3. For the drafting history of Article 30 of the ICC Statute see Roger S. Clark, The Mental Element in International Criminal Law: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Elements of Offences, 12 CRIM. L. FORUM 291 (2001).
4. Rome Statute, Article 30.
5. See Erkin Gadirov and Roger Clark, Article 9 - Elements of Crimes, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE, 505-529 (Otto Triffterer, ed., 2nd edn., 2008) at 513.
6. As a result of the omission of the earlier draft of then Article 28 on actus reus 'causation' can hardly be seen as a requisite material element in the Statute (ibid).
7. For more details on the element of causation see ibid at 521-522.
8. See also Otto Triffterer, Causality, as a Separate Element of the Doctrine of Superior Responsibility as Expressed in Article 28 Rome Statute?, 1.5 LJIL 179 (2002).
9. See also Donald k. Piragoff and Darryl Robinson, Article 30 - Mental Element, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE, 849 (Otto Triffterer, ed., 2nd edn., 2008) at 851-852.
10. Section 1.13(10) of the Model Penal Code. For more information on the Model Penal Code, see Herbert Wechsler, Codification of the Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code, 68 COLUM L. REV. 1425 (1968);
11. Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of A Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097 (1952).
12. See also Jerome Hall, The Proposal to Prepare a Model Penal Code, 4 JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 91 (1951-1952).
13. For the recent work by the American Law Institute on the MPC, see AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, (The American Law Institute, 1985).
14. As for the definition of material elements in the German literature particularly, what so called the theory on negative legal elements of the offence or 'Lehre von den negativen Tatbestandsmerkmalen', see VOLKER KREY, Deutsches Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, Vol. 2, (2003) at 15, 17.
15. Kelt and von Hebel used the phrase 'material elements and the principle of mens rea coverage' instead of 'element analysis', see Maria Kelt and Herman von Hebel, General Principles of Criminal Law and the Elements of Crimes, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, 19-40 (Roy Lee ed., 2001).
16. See the AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Vol. 1, (The American Law Institute, 1985). It is worth pointing out that within United States there are fifty-two American criminal codes, and it is often difficult to state 'the American rule on any point of criminal law'.
17. Model Penal Code and Commentaries, § 2.02, supra note 6, at 229, n. 1.
18. Model Penal Code, § 2.02(4).
19. Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3, 1st. Sess., Official Record (adopted by the Assembly of States Parties on September 9, 2002).
20. Rome Statute, Article 30(2)(a).
21. Rome Statute, Article 30(2)(b).
22. Rome Statute, Article 30(3).
23. Piragoff and Robinson, Article 30 - Mental Element, supra note 5, at 852-853.
24. See the very recent and challenging discussion on the subject by Kevin Jon Heller, Mistake of Legal Element, the Common Law, and Article 32 of the Rome Statute, A Critica Analysisl, 6 JICJ 419 (2008).
25. See footnote 15.
26. Ibid., at 853.
27. Ibid.
28. See footnote 11.
29. Piragoff and Robinson, Article 30 - Mental Element, supra note 5, at 853.
30. Maria Kelt and Herman von Hebel, What Are the Elements of Crimes?, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, 13-18 (Roy Lee ed., 2001): 'there was considerable debate [during the negotiations of the elements of crimes] as to whether they [the contextual elements] really were "material elements" - and if so whether they were (fully) covered by the mental element of article 30 - or whether they formed a separate type of element. Some participants thought, for example, that there might be a category of elements that are neither material nor mental, but which should be considered "jurisdictional" or "merely jurisdictional". Ultimately, however, an explicit decision as to whether these elements were "material elements" became unnecessary, as for each, contextual element some corresponding mental element [however, lower than that, provided for under Article 30] was specified in most cases, which, as a result, [...] rendered the other question moot'.
31. See Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, (Case No. IT-95-14-A) Judgment, July 29, 2004, para. 41.
32. See also Prosecutor v. Naser Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Trial Judgment, 30 June 2006 (Orić Trial Judgment), para. 279.
33. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, (3rd edn., 2001) at 119;
34. See also GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART, §§ 16, 18 (2nd edn., 1961).
35. See footnote 12.
36. See footnote 13.
37. Clark, The Mental Element in International Criminal Law, supra note 3, at 303, n. 38.
38. As suggested by Piragoff and Robinson, Article 30 - Mental Element, supra note 5, at 859;
39. Gerhard Werle and Florian Jessberger, 'Unless Otherwise Provided -Article 30 of the ICC Statute and the Mental Element of Crimes under International Criminal Law, 3 JICJ 35 (2005) at 41;
40. Albin Eser, Mental Elements, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2001) at 913.
41. Clark, The Mental Element in International Criminal Law, supra note 3, at 303, n. 39.
42. Piragoff and Robinson, Article 30 - Mental Element, supra note 5, at 859.
43. United States v. Hilliard, 31 F.3d 1509 (10th Cir. 1994).
44. See Michael Duttwiller, Liability for Omission in International Criminal Law, 6 ICLR 1 (2006) at 56-58.
45. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, (Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee During March-April and August 1996), U.N. GAOR 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, UN Doc. A/51/22 (1996) Vol. I, p. 45, and Vol. II, at 90.
46. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/AC249/1998/CRP.7 (1998), pp. 64-65 (article) 28.
47. Piragoff' and Robinson, Article 30 - Mental Element, supra note 5, at 858-859.
48. Eser, Mental Elements, supra note 27, at 912;
49. See also footnote 29.
50. Gadirov and Clark, Article 9 - Elements of Crimes, supra note 5, at 515.
51. Lubanga Décision sur la confirmation des charges, supra note 1, paras. 351-355. In the present case, Pre-Trial Chamber I employed the phrase 'omissions' eight times while discussing Article 30 of the ICC Statute.
52. Judgment, Limaj (IT-03-66-T), Trial Chamber, 30 November 2005, § 509 (emphasis added); Judgment, Krstić (IT-98-33-A), Appeals Chamber, 19 April 2004, § 188;
53. Judgment, Kunarać (IT-96-23-T & IT-9623/1-T), Trial Chamber, 22 February 2001, § 390;
54. Judgment, Gacumbitsi (ICTR-2001-64-T, Trial Judgment, 17 June 2004, § 285 ("Committing" refers generally to the direct and physical perpetration of the crime by the offender himself);
55. Judgment, Kayishema (ICTR-95-1-A), Appeals Chamber, 1 June 2001, § 187;
56. Judgment, Vasiljević (IT-98-32-T), Trial Chamber, 29 Nov. 2002, § 62 ('The Accused will only incur individual criminal responsibility for committing a crime under Article 7(1) where is it is proved the he personally physically perpetrated the criminal acts in question or personally omitted to do something in violation of international humanitarian law');
57. Judgment, Kamuhanda (ICTR-99-54A-T), Trial Chamber, § 595 (To commit a crime usually means to perpetrate or execute the crime by oneself or to omit to fulfil a legal obligation in a manner punishable by penal law.');
58. See also Judgment, Tadić (IT-94-1-A), Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999, § 188;
59. Judgment, Kunarac (IT-96-23-T & IT-9623/1-T), Trial Chamber, 22 February 2001, § 390;
60. Judgment, Krstić (IT-98-33-T), Trial Chamber, 2 August 2001, § 601;
61. Judgment, Krnojelac (IT-97-25-T), Trial Chamber, 15 March 2002, § 73.
62. Judgment, Blagoje Simić (IT-95-9-T) Trial Chamber, 17 October 2003, § 137 ('Any finding of commission requires the personal or physical, direct or indirect, participation of the accused in the relevant criminal act, or a finding that the accused engendered a culpable omission to the same effect, where it is established that he had a duty to act, with requisite knowledge.').
63. Model Penal Code, § 2.02(2)(a)(i).
64. United States v. Bailey et al., 444 U.S. 394; 100 S. Ct. 624; 62 L. Ed. 2d 575;
65. U.S. Lexis 69, November 7, 1979, Argued, January 21, 1980, Decided, at 632;
66. See also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445 (1978).
67. KREY, DEUTSCHES STRAFRECHT: ALLGEMEINER TEIL, supra note 6, at 109.
68. Cramer, in STRAFGESETZBUCH: KOMMENTAR, (Schönke and Schröder eds., 1997) at 263. (Absicht... liegt nur dann vor, wenn der Handlungswille des Täters final gerade auf den vom Gesetz bezeichneten Handlungserfolg gerichtet war);
69. LACKNER, Strafge-setzbuch, (München: Beck, 1991) 95.
70. For more details on Vorsatz in German criminal law in the English language see Mohamed Elewa Badar, Mens Rea - Mistake of Law and Mistake of Fact in German Criminal Law: A Survey for International Criminal Tribunals, 5 ICLR 203 (2005).
71. Lubanga Décision sur la confirmation des charges, supra note 1.
72. Ibid., para. 351.
73. Ibid.
74. Rome Statute, Chapeau element of Article 6: '... genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy ...'
75. Rome Statute, Article 7(2)(f): '"Forced pregnancy" means the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant, with intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population ...'
76. Rome Statute, Article 7(2)(h): '"Enforced disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention or abduction ... with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.'
77. See Mohamed Elewa Badar, Drawing the Boundaries of Mens Rea in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 6 ICLR 313 (2006) at 317-328.
78. Lubanga Décision sur la confirmation des charges, supra note 1, para. 352.
79. Ibid.
80. As suggested by Werls and Jessberger, Unless Otherwise Provided, supra note 27, at n. 34.
81. See Otto Triffterer, The New International Criminal Law - Its General Principles Establishing Individual Criminal Responsibility, in THE NEW INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, 639-727 (Kalliopi Koufa ed., 2003) at 706.
82. Eser, Mental Elements, supra note 27, at 915: "... the perpetrators being aware that the action will result in the prohibited consequence ... with certainty..."
83. Model Penal Code, § 2.02(2)(b)(ii).
84. For a thorough analysis of the notion of 'oblique intent' in the criminal law of England see Glanville Williams, Oblique Intention, 46 CAMBRIDGE LJ (1987) 417.
85. Ibid., at 420.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
88. Buzzanga (1979) 49 C.C.C. (2d) 369 (Ont.C.A), per Justice Martin, quoted in DON STUART, CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW: A TREATISE (2001) at 218-219. The relevant facts of the case as summarised by Stuart were as follows: The accused had been convicted ... of wilfully promoting hatred against the French Canadian public in Essex County. They had circulated an inflammatory handbill entitled 'Wake Up Canadians Your Future is At Stake'. The two accused, who identified with French Canadian aspirations and culture, denied intent to promote hatred. They were involved with a movement to establish a French language high school in Essex County. Their purpose was to dramatise how ridiculous the opposition had been and to prompt the government into quick intervention.
89. BGHSt 21, 283 (Vol. 21, at 283).
90. Eser, Mental Elements, supra note 27, at 914-915.
91. Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections, 10 EJIL 158 (1999), at 153: 'While it is no doubt meritorious to have defined these two notions [intent and knowledge in Article 30], it appears questionable to have excluded recklessness as a culpable mens rea under the Statute.';
92. Johan D. Van der Vyver, The International Criminal Court and the Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law, 12 MIAMI INT'L & COMP L. REV. 57-149 (2004), at 64-65: 'Antonio Cassese has criticized the ICC Statute for not recognizing "recklessness" as the basis of liability for war crimes. However, if one takes into account the resolve to confine the jurisdiction of the ICC to "the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole," it is reasonable to accept that crimes committed without the highest degree of dolus ought as a general rule not to be prosecuted in the ICC.';
93. Werle and Jessberger, Unless Otherwise Provided, supra note 27, at 41-42: 'This interpretation of Article 30(2)(b) and 3 ICCSt., which appears to be shared by most commentators, results in the establishment of a standard of mens rea apparently stricter than that usually applied by both, domestic and international courts.'
94. Werle and Jessberger, 'Unless Otherwise Provided', supra note 27, at 53: 'the requirements of the perpetrator's being aware that the consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events or of the perpetrator's meaning to cause that consequence (Article 30(2)(b) ICCSt.) excludes both forms of subjective accountability. It thus follows from the wording of Article 30(2)(b) that recklessness and dolus eventualis do not meet the requirement.'
95. Piragoff and Robinson, Article 30 - Mental Element, supra note 5, at 533-544;
96. Hans H. H. Jescheck, The General Principles of International Criminal Law Set Out in Nuremberg, as Mirrored in the ICC Statute, 2 JICJ 38-55 (2004), at 45.
97. Ferrando Mantovani, The General Principles of International Criminal Law: The Viewpoint of a National Criminal Lawyer, 1 JICJ 26-38 (2003), at 32: '... the ICC Statute's provision on the mental element (Article 30) appears to limit itself to intent (dolus) alone, thereby excluding negligence (culpa). Using ambiguous and psychologically imprecise wording ... It ... does include intent and recklessness (dolus eventualis) ...';
98. Clark, The Mental Element in International Criminal Law, supra note 3, at 301.
99. See R. v. G and Another [2004] 1 AC 1034 (HL).
100. DON STUART, CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW, A TREATISE, supra note 60, at 224.
101. Sansregret v. The Queen, [1985] 45 C.R. (3d) 193, 203-204 (S.C.C).
102. ibid.
103. U.S. v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d at 1146.
104. Model Penal Code, § 2.02(2)(c).
105. ibid.
106. United States v. Albers, 226 F. 3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2000).
107. United States, v. Albers, 226 F. 3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2000), citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1.994) (emphasis added);
108. see also United States. v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001).
109. David M. Treiman, Recklessness and the Model Penal Code, 9 AM J CRIM LAW 281 (1981), at 351.
110. See FINBARR MCAULEY AND J. PAUL MCCUTCHEON, CRIMINAL LIABILITY (2000) 301-303.
111. Heribert Schumann, Criminal Law, in INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW, (Werner F. Ebke and Matthew W. Finkin eds., 1996), at 389-390.
112. BGHSt 36, 1; 44, 99; BGH NStZ (Neue Zeitschrift, fuer Strafrecht) 1999, p. 507; BGH NStZ 2000, 583.
113. JOHANNES WESSELS AND WERNER BEULKE, STRAFRECHT: ALLGEMEINER TEIL 76 (2002).
114. CLAUS ROXIN, STRAFRECHT: ALLGEMEINER TEIL, 376 (1997).
115. Ibid.
116. Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Judgment, 31 July 2003 (Stakić Trial Judgment), para. 587.
117. Ibid.
118. Ibid.
119. The perpetrator could still be held criminally responsible and liable for being consciously negligent.
120. Ibid., para. 351.
121. Elewa Badar, Drawing the Boundaries of Mens Rea, supra note 49, at 313.
122. See footnote 50.
123. Ibid., para. 352 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted).
124. Ibid., paras. 353-354.
125. Ibid., para. 355.
126. In French criminal law, a distinction is made between two forms of intent, namely, dol général (general intent - to act unlawfully) and dol spécial which must be proved for certain offences. The term 'dol' in French criminal law means the deliberate intention to commit a wrong and involves both 'knowledge' that something is prohibited and the 'deliberate willingness' to carry out the proscribed conduct. The classic definition of dol général is provided by Emel Garçon, the eminent nineteenth century French criminal law scholar: "L'intention, dans son sens juridique, est la volonté de commettre le délit tel qu'il est déterminé par la loi; c'est la conscience, chez le coupable, d'enfreindre les prohibitions légales... " According to Garçon, dol général encompassed two mental elements: la conscience (awareness) and la volonté (willingness/desire). This definition of dol général was accepted by subsequent French legal scholars. The element of conscience, in French criminal law, simply refers to the accused's knowledge that he or she is breaking the law. This implies a similarity between the facts as understood by the perpetrator and as described in the criminal code. With regard to the element of 'desire', it is interpreted as simply referring to the accused's willingness to commit the wrongful act and not the desire to accomplish the result of the act in question. On French criminal law see JOHN BELL, SOPHIE BOYRON AND SIMON WHITTAKER, PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAW, (1998);
127. BRICE DIKSON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW, (1994);
128. EMILE GARÇON, CODE PÉ NAL ANNOTÉ (1st ed., 1901);
129. Catherine Elliot, The French Law of Intent and Its Influence of the Development of International Criminal Law, 11 CRIM L. FORUM 36 (2000).
130. R. MERLE AND A. VITUE, TRAITÉ DE DROIT PÉNAL (1997).
131. Lubanga Décision sur la confirmation des charges, supra note 1, at n. 438.
132. For different opinions on the concept of dolus eventualis see GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, (2000) at 445-446: (dolus eventualis entails 'a particular subjective posture towards the result');
133. See also Mihajlo Acimovic, Conceptions of Culpability in Contemporary American Law, 26 LA. L. REV. 28 (1965), at 48 (describing a Romanist law test according to which the perpetrator acted intentionally if he could have said to himself: It may be either so or different, it may happen either so or differently; anyhow I shall act.)
134. For a different opinion see Paul T. Smith, Recklessness in Dolus Eventualis, 96 SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL 81 (1979): (criticizing South African law to the extent that it interprets dolus eventualis as indifference rather than foresight).
135. Lubanga Décision sur la confirmation des charges, Supra note 2 above, fn. 438.
136. Cassese, The Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 63, at 153-154.
137. Ibid., at 154.
138. Triffterer, 'The New International Criminal Law', supra note 53, at 706.
139. Kai Ambos, General Principles of Criminal Law in the Rome Statute, 10 CRIM. L. FORUM 1-32 (1999), at 21-22.
140. For an in depth analysis of the criminal intent in Islamic criminal law see MOHAMED ELEWA BADAR, THE CONCEPT OF MENS REA IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE CASE FOR A UNIFIED APPROACH (Hart Publishing, June 2009).
141. Compare Rome Statute, Article 30 (2) (b) and Article 30 (3).
142. See footnote 14.
143. Ibid.
144. Rome Statute, Article 7(1): 'For the purpose of this Statute, "crime against humanity" means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with the knowledge of the attack.'
145. Rome Statute, Article 7(l)(g).
146. Rome Statute, Articles 8(2)(b)(xxii), and Article 8(2)(e)(vi).
147. Contra see Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A, Appeal Judgment, 7 July 2006, (Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment) in which the prosecution argued that non-consent of the victim and the perpetrator's knowledge thereof should not be considered as constitutive elements of the offence that must be proved by the Prosecution.
148. Contra see the Model Penal Code § 2.02(7) which stretched the definition of knowledge with regard to the attendant circumstance to encompass 'awareness of high probability of the existence of a particular fact'.
149. Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part, supra note 23, at 159.
150. Rome Statute, Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi); Article 8(2)(e)(vii). It is to be noted that the latter Article incriminate the enlisting of children into "armed forces or groups". The reason is that this Article applied to war crimes committed in armed conflicts not of an international character.
151. Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3, 1st Sess., Official Record (adopted by the Assembly of States Parties on September 9, 2002) reprinted in WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, (2004) 310. Article 8(2)(b) (xxvi) War Crime of using, conscripting or enlisting children.
152. See Kelt and von Hebel, General Principles of Criminal Law and the Elements of Crimes, supra note 7, at 31.
153. Smith & Hogan, Criminal Law, (2005) at 109-110.
154. Elements of Crimes, Article 8(2)(b)(vii)-l, reprinted in Schabas, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 110, at 299.
155. Elements of Crimes, Article 8(2)(b)(vii)-2., reprinted ibid at 299.
156. Elements of Crimes, Article 8(2)(b)(vii)(3)-l, and Article 8(2)(b)(vii)(3)-2, reprinted ibid at 299 (emphasis added).
157. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 110, at 108.
158. Rome Statute, Article 6(1).
159. Rome Statute, Article 7.
160. Rome Statute, Article 7 (2)(b), (emphasis added).
161. Rome Statute, Article 8. Other crimes provided for in the ICC Statute contains in their definition a subjective element, see Article 7(2) (e), (f) and (h); Article 8 (2) (b) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (ix), (xxiv) and (xxv), and Article 8 (2) (e) (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv).
162. See in general Werle and Jessberger, Unless Otherwise Provided, supra note 27. Piragoff hold the same opinion: 'The major significance of Article 30, however, is its affect on definitions that do not expressly specify a mental element. Although a particular definition of a crime may be silent as to the requisite mental element, Article 30 would import the mental elements of "intent and knowledge" as being the mental elements require in order to render an accused criminally responsible and liable for punishment for that particular crime.'
163. See Donald D. Piragoff, Article 30 - Mental Element, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE, 527-535 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999) at 531.
164. Ibid., at 531.
165. Ibid.
166. Ibid.
167. Margaret McAuliffe deGuzman, Article 21 Applicable Law, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE, 435 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999) at 436-438.
168. Rome Statute, Article 21.
169. Adopted by the Preparatory Commission of the International Criminal Court in June 2000, see Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court. Finalized draft text of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (PCNICC/2000/l/Add.l); and Finalized draft text of the Elements of Crimes (PCNICC/2000/l/Add.2).
170. Rome Statute, Article 6 (e).
171. Claus Kress, The Crime of Genocide under International Law, 6 ICLR 461 (2006) at 485 (emphasis in original, footnotes omitted).
172. Lubanga Décision sur la confirmation des charges, supra note 1, para. 356.
173. Ibid., para. 358. The Pre-Trial. Chamber I observed, that: 'The "should have known" requirement set forth in the Elements of Crimes - which is to be distinguished from the "must have known" or constructive knowledge requirement - falls within the concept of negligence because it is met when the suspect: i. did not know that the victims were under the age of fifteen years at the time they were enlisted, conscripted or used to participate actively in hostilities; and ii. lacked, such knowledge because he or she did not act with due diligence in the relevant circumstances one can only say that the suspect" should have known" if his or her lack of knowledge results from his or her failure to comply with his or her duty to act with due diligence).'
174. Ibid., paras. 356-359.
175. Ibid., para. 360.
176. See the sixth element of the Elements of Crimes of Article 6(e) Genocide by forcibly transferring children. For more information on this specific crime see Kurt Mundorff, 2008, Working Paper: Other Peoples' Children: A Textual and Contextual Interpretation of the Genocide Convention, Article 2(e), The Selected Works of Kurt Mundorff, available at http://works.bepress.com/kurt- mundorff/3/, last visited June 22, 2008.
177. Erkin Gadirov, Article 9 - Elements of Crimes, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE, (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999) at 301-302.
178. See footnote 11, pp. 113-115.
179. ICC-ASP/1/3, Article 6(a) Genocide by killing.
180. Rome Statute, Article 25(3)(a), (letters added).
181. BASSIOUNI, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: AN ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE EVOLUTION OF THE STATUTE, (2005) at 200.
182. Lubanga Décision sur la confirmation des charges, supra note 1, paras. 322-367.
183. Ibid., para. 326.
184. Ibid.
185. Ibid., para. 328.
186. Ibid., para. 329.
187. Ibid., para. 330.
188. Ibid., para. 331.
189. Ibid., para. 330.
190. Ibid., para. 332.
191. CLAUS ROXIN, TÄTERSCHAFT UND TATHERRSCHAFT, (2000) at 294, 299.
192. Lubanga Décision sur la confirmation des charges, supra note 1, paras. 343-345.
193. Ibid., paras. 346-348.
194. Ibid., paras. 349-360.
195. Ibid., paras. 366-367.
196. Ibid., para. 349.
197. Ibid., para. 361.
198. Ibid.
199. Ibid., para. 365.
200. Ibid., paras. 366-367.
201. Kai Ambos, Article 25 - Individual Criminal Responsibility, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE, 435 743-769 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2008) at 757.
202. Model Penal Code and Commentaries, supra note 6, § 2.06 Comment at 312, at n. 42.
203. Ibid.
204. Piragoff and Robinson, Mental Element - Article 30, supra note 5, at 855.
205. Ibid.
206. Blaškić Appeal Judgment, supra note 22, para. 41.
207. Orić Trial Judgment, supra note 22, para. 288 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted).
208. William A. Schabas, General Principles of Criminal Law in the International Criminal Court Statute (Part III), 6 EUR J CRIME CR L CR J 84 (1998), 95-98.
209. Ambos, 'Individual Criminal responsibility', supra note 158, 757.
210. Eser arrived to the same conclusion, see Eser, Individual Criminal Responsibility, THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, (Cassese et al. eds., 2002) at 801.
211. Rome Statute, Article 25(3)(d).
212. Eser, Individual Criminal Responsibility, supra note 166, at 802-804.
213. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-356, Document Containing the Charges, Article 61(3)(a), August 28, 2006, para. 20.
214. Antonio Cassese, The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 JICJ 109 (2007), at 112.
215. Ibid.
216. See footnote 125.
217. Ibid.
218. The notion of joint criminal enterprise as adopted by the two ad hoc Tribunals has been a source of endless fascination for commentators, generating an enormous amount of literature: Allen O'Rourke, Joint Criminal Enterprise and Brdanin: Misguided Over-Correction, 47 HARV INTL L. J. 307 (2006);
219. Antonio Cassese, The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 JICJ 109 (2007);
220. Allison Marston Danner and Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Law, 93 CAL L. REV. 75 (2005);
221. Kai Ambos, Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility, 5 JICJ (2007) 159;
222. Mohamed Elewa Badar, "Just Convict Everyone!" 'Joint Perpetration: From Tadić to Stakić and Back Again, 6 ICLR 293 (2006);
223. Kai Hamdorf, The Concept of a Joint Criminal Enterprise and Domestic Modes of Liability for Parties to a Crime: A Comparison of German and English Law, 5 JICJ 208 (2007);
224. Jens David Ohlin, Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 JICJ 69 (2007);
225. Nicola Piacente, Importance of the Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrine for the ICTY Prosecutorial Policy, 2 JICJ 446 (2004);
226. Katrina Gustafson, The Requirement of an 'Express Agreement' for Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability: A Critique of Brdanin, 5 JICJ 1.34 (2007);
227. Harmen van der Wilt, Joint Criminal Enterprise, Possibilities and Limitations, 5 JICJ 91 (2007);
228. Elies van Sliedregt, Pathway to Convicting Individuals for Genocide, 5 JICJ 184 (2007).
229. For critical analysis of the third category of JCE, see Elewa Badar, supra note 174.
230. The travaux préparatoires of the first Additional Protocol is reproduced in four volumes and one supplement in the work of HOWARD S. LEVIE, PROTECTION OF WAR CRIMES: PROTOCOL 1 TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS, (1981). The Supplement appears in year (1985).
231. Proposed Amendment to Article 76 by Syrian Arab Republic, CDDH/1/74, 20 March 1974, Official Records, Vol. III, p. 328, in Levie, Protection of War Crimes, ibid., at 302.
232. Mr. Cerda (Argentina), CDDH/I/74, in Levie, ibid., at 306.
233. Ibid.
234. Proposal submitted by the United States (A/CONF.183/C.1/L.2) (emphasis added) reprinted in M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE, (2005) paras. 67-68.
235. UN Doc. A/CONF 183/C.l/SR.l (16 June 1998), Mr. Nathan (Israel), reprinted in Bassiouni, Summary Records of the Diplomatic Conference, ibid., at 78, para. 73.
236. Ibid.
237. Prosecutor v. Sefer Halilović, Case No. IT-01-48-T, Trial Judgment, 16 November 2005, (Halilović Trial Judgment) para. 71;
238. Blaškić Appeal Judgment, supra note 22, para. 63;
239. Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-A, Judgment 3, 3 July 2002, (Bagilishema Appeal Judgment), paras. 34-35.
240. Lubanga Décision sur la confirmation des charges, supra note 1, n. 439.
241. Ibid.
242. Ibid.
243. Blaškić Appeal Judgment, supra note 22, para. 62.
244. David M. Treiman, Recklessness and the Model Penal Code, supra note 75, at 351.
245. Ibid.
246. Ibid.
247. Rome Statute, Article 32(1).
248. Rome Statute, Article 32(2).
249. Otto Triffterer, Article 32 - Mistake of Fact or Mistake of Law, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE, 895-914 (Otto Triffterer, ed., 2nd edn., 2008) at 902 (italics in the original).
250. Lubanga Décision sur la confirmation des charges, supra note 1, para. 304. See also Transcript, 26 November 2006.
251. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, (3rd edn., 2007) at 230.
252. Lubanga Décision sur la confirmation des charges, supra note 1, para. 305.
253. Ibid., paras. 315-316 (footnotes omitted).
254. Thomas Weigend, Intent, Mistake of Law, and Co-perpetration in the Lubanga Decision on Confirmation of Charges, 6 JICJ 471 (2008) at 476.
255. Ibid.
256. Ibid., at 482.
257. Lubanga Décision sur la confirmation des charges, supra note 1, paras. 356-359.
258. According to paragraph 2 of Article 66 'the onus is on the Prosecutor to prove the guilt of the accused.'
259. Sunan Al Tirmizi, Vol. 4, p. 25.
260. Abd El-Khaleq Ebn Al Mofaddal Ahmaddon, Qa'edat dar'e al hedood bel-Shobehat wa atharoha fi al fiqh al gena'ei al islami (The Rule of Eliminating Penalty on Suspicion Criterion and Its Role in Islamic Penal Jurisdiction), 7 CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE RESEARCH JOURNAL 7-75 (1995), at 9.