'Unless otherwise provided': Article 30 of the ICC Statute and the mental element of crimes under international criminal law

Journal of International Criminal Justice

Volumn 3, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 35-55

  Werle, Gerhard ^a   Jessberger, Florian ^a  

^a HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 27244443808     PISSN: 14781387     EISSN: 14781395     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jicj/3.1.35     Document Type: Review

References (211)

1. For details, see G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2005), marginal no. 295.
2. The concept of strict liability which can be found in some domestic systems (see, e.g. A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 125) is unknown to international criminal law.
3. ICTY, Judgment, Mucić et al. (IT-96-21-T), Trial Chamber, 16 November 1998, §§ 424 et seq.
4. See also Nuremberg Tribunal, Judgment of 1 October 1946, in The Trial of German Major War Criminals. Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, Germany (London: HM State Office, 1950), Part 22, at 506. The defendant, Schacht, was acquitted by the Nuremberg Tribunal because the 'necessary inference [that Schacht had knowledge of the plans of the attack] has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt';
5. US Military Tribunal Nuremberg, Judgment of 10 April 1948 (Otto Ohlendorf et al., so-called Einsatzgruppen Trial), in Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. IV (Nuremberg, 1949), 470 ('intent is a basic prerequisite for crime(s)');
6. see also A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 159 et seq.
7. Notable examples are the definitions of genocide ('intent...to destroy...a group', Art. 4(2) ICTYSt.) and of certain war crimes ('wilful killing' or 'wilfully causing great suffering', Art. 2(a) and (c) ICTYSt.).
8. See R. Clark, 'The Mental Element in the International Criminal Law: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Elements of Offences', 12 Criminal Law Forum (2001), 291-334, at 295
9. A. Eser,'Mental Elements: Mistake of Fact and Mistake of Law', in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. R. W. D. Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 889-948, at 893 et seq.
10. W. Schabas, 'General Principles of Criminal Law in the International Criminal Court Statute', 4 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Justice and Criminal Law (1998), 400-428, at 419
11. E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2003), 48 et seq.
12. Werle, supra note 1, marginal no. 295.
13. See also the detailed analysis of the Nuremberg judgment and the Nuremberg follow-up trials in H.-H. Jescheck, Die Verantwortlichkeit der Staatsorgane nach Völkerstrafrecht (Bonn: Ludwig Röhrscheid Verlag, 1952), 375 et seq.
14. and K. Ambos, Der Allgemeine Teil des Völkerstrafrechts (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2002), 107 et seq.
15. Cassese, supra note 3, at 159 et seq.
16. Practice and scholarly contributions typically rely on the categories of Anglo-American law. According to that (and notwithstanding that the use of language varies greatly), it is possible to distinguish between four levels of culpability: Purpose; knowledge; recklessness; and negligence. See s. 2.02(1) of the Model Penal Code (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1985);
17. for details on these categories of fault, see Ashworth, supra note 2, at 173.
18. In this article, we also use the corresponding civil-law concepts of fault (Vorsatz): Dolus directus of a first degree (purpose), dolus directus of a second degree (knowledge), dolus eventualis (recklessness); for a comparative view on fault principles in civil law and common law, see T. Weigend, 'Zwischen Vorsatz und Fahrlässigkeit', 93 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (1981) 657-700, at 673 et seq.
19. See also Cassese, supra note 3, at 161,
20. and Eser, ibid., at 905 et seq.
21. E.g. the crime against humanity of killing under Art. 5(a) ICTYSt. requires either 'intent to kill' or at least 'intent to inflict serious injury in reckless disregard of human life', ICTY, Judgment, Kupreškić et al. (IT-95-16), Trial Chamber, 14 January 2000, § 561. According to Art. 2(b) ICTYSt., among others, the war crime of torture presumes that the injury was caused 'intentionally', ICTY, Judgment, Mucić et al. (IT96-21-T), Trial Chamber, 16 November 1998, §494.
22. See also Werle, supra note 1, at marginal no. 334.
23. But see Werle, supra note 1, marginal nos 381 et seq.
24. For the notion of 'crimes under international law' and the distinction between crimes under international law and (other) international crimes, such as terrorism and torture, see Werle, supra note 1, marginal nos 72 et seq.
25. See T. Weigend, 'The Harmonization of General Principles of Criminal Law: The Statutes and Jurisprudence of the ICTY, ICTR and ICC: An Overview, 19 Nouvelles Études Pénales (2004) 319-335, at 326 ('dismal failure').
26. See also Weigend, ibid., at 326 et seq.
27. But see infra notes 47 et seq. and accompanying text.
28. The term 'intention' is used here as including both purpose (dolus directus of a first degree) and knowledge (dolus directus of a second degree);
29. see also Ashworth, supra note 2, at 173 et seq.
30. Both conditions must be present at the time of the act's commission; dolus antecedens or subsequens is insufficient,
31. see Eser, supra note 5, at 930.
32. The wording 'intent and knowledge' was a subject of intense disagreement right up to the end of the negotiations in Rome; see D. Piragoff, 'Article 30 - Mental Element', in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999), at marginal no. 10
33. P. Saland, 'International Criminal Law Principles, in R. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court, The Making of the Rome Statute (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999) 189-216, at 205. It was mainly at France's instigation that the word 'and' was accepted in place of the word 'or' included in the draft;
34. see Clark, supra note 5, at 302.
35. On the drafting history of the rule, see generally Clark, supra note 5, at 296
36. Eser, supra note 5, at 894 et seq.
37. For the doctrine of mens rea in common-law systems, see the references, supra note 6.
38. See for the distinction of material elements Ambos, supra note 5, at 764 et seq.
39. Clark, supra note 5, at 306
40. M. Kelt and H. von Hebel, 'What are Elements of Crimes?', in R. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers, 2001) 13-40, at 14 and 26
41. Piragoff, supra note 15, at marginal no. 6
42. Werle, supra note 1, at marginal nos 299 et seq.
43. The distinction between conduct, consequences and circumstances arises from common-law doctrine (see Eser, supra note 5, at 911 et seq.).
44. Thus, for example, in shooting someone to death, which constitutes the crime against humanity of killing, the conduct required under Art. 30(2)(a) ICCSt. occurs (only) in pulling the weapon's trigger, while the fact that the victim was hit by the bullet and dies as a result is a 'consequence', to which different subjective requirements apply;
45. see Clark, supra note 5, at 306.
46. The preliminary drafts still spoke of 'act or omission' (Art. 28 Draft-ICCSt.);
47. see Saland, supra note 15, at 212.
48. See Werle, supra note 1, at marginal nos 502 et seq. Examples include Art. 28 ICCSt. (command responsibility) and Art. 8(2)(b)(xxv) ICCSt. ('intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival.').
49. See Ambos, supra note 5, at 765
50. Eser, supra note 5, at 913
51. Kelt and von Hebel, supra note 17, at 26.
52. See Eser, supra note 5, at 914 ('all definitional effects which may ensue from the prohibited conduct').
53. Article 8(2)(a)(ii) ICCSt. (causing great physical suffering to the victim).
54. Article 8(2)(b)(x) ICCSt. (seriously endangering the health of the victim);
55. see Kelt and von Hebel, supra note 17, at 15.
56. In common law, 'circumstances' are normally understood to mean facts arising from legally established factual requirements and do not describe the conduct itself or the consequences of the act;
57. see Ambos, supra note 5, at 766.
58. Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) ICCSt.
59. Article 8(2)(a) ICCSt.;
60. see Kelt and von Hebel, supra note 17, at 15 and 27.
61. On the dispute over the classification of the contextual elements at the Rome conference, see Werle, supra note 1, at marginal nos 325 et seq.
62. See Elements of Crimes, General Introduction, no. 7.
63. See Kelt and von Hebel, supra note 17, at 15.
64. For details, see Werle, supra note 1, at marginal no. 278.
65. See Eser, supra note 5, at 913
66. Piragoff, supra note 15, at marginal no. 19
67. contra Ambos, supra note 5, at 767.
68. Contra Ambos, supra note 5, at 770, who argues that the perpetrator must mean to cause the consequence and be aware that it will occur.
69. E.g. a soldier who aims at destroying a building while not wishing to kill civilians whom he knows are in the building may be liable for a war crime under Art. 8(2)(a)(i) ICCSt. if the building is in fact destroyed and the civilians are killed.
70. In fact, the wording of Art. 30(2)(b) ICCSt. corresponds to the text in the English Draft Criminal Code Bill, which was presented to the Parliament by the Law Commission in 1989, but has never been implemented. Under clause 18(b)(ii) of that Draft Bill, a person acts 'intentionally' - as distinguished from 'recklessly' - with respect to a result when he acts either in order to bring it about or being aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events;
71. see The Law Commission, A Criminal Code for England and Wales, Vol 1: Report and draft Criminal Code Bill (London: HMSO, 1989).
72. See infra note 95. Remarkably, the few commentators who advocate the inclusion of recklessness and dolus eventualis in the Standard set by Art. ICCst. hardly ever give any reasons for their position.
73. For details, see infra note 92 and accompanying text.
74. For details, see infra note 92 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g. s. 2 of the German Code of Crimes against International Law; for discussion, see G. Werle and F. Jessberger, 'International Criminal Justice is Coming Home: The New German Code of Crimes Against International Law, 13 Criminal Law Forum (2002) 191-223, at 202.
76. See Art. 22(2) ICCSt.
77. See infra notes 91 et seq. and accompanying text.
78. Article 30(3) ICCSt.
79. See also Elements of Crimes, Introduction, no. 4: 'With respect to mental elements associated with elements involving value judgment, such as those using the terms "inhumane" or "severe", it is not necessary that the perpetrator personally completed a particular value judgment, unless otherwise indicated.';
80. see Kelt and von Hebel, supra note 17, at 34.
81. See also Ambos, supra note 5, at 786 et seq.
82. Eser, supra note 5, at 925
83. O. Triffterer, 'Article 32: Mistake of Fact or Mistake of Law', in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Baden-Baden: Nomos,1999), marginal nos 16 and 32.
84. However, there are exceptions to this principle; e.g. under Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) ICCSt., it is required that the perpetrator realizes that the harm caused by his or her attack was unmistakably out of proportion to the expected military advantage. On this point, the Elements of Crimes state: 'As opposed to the general rule set forth in paragraph 4 of the General Introduction, this knowledge element requires that the perpetrator make the value judgment as described therein'; see Art. 8(2)(b)(iv), no. 3, footnote 37, Elements of Crimes.
85. This is confirmed in the Elements of Crimes: 'The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the protected status of the person; see Art. 8(2)(a)(i), no. 3, Elements of Crimes.
86. See Kelt and von Hebel, supra note 17, at 35.
87. For a critical assessment, see Ambos, supra note 5, at 788.
88. See also Ambos, supra note 5, at 805
89. Clark, supra note 5, at 321
90. Eser, supra note 5, at 898
91. Piragoff, supra note 15, at marginal no. 14.
92. '[I]ntent to destroy' (genocide, Art. 6 ICCSt.); 'intentionally causing great suffering' (crime against humanity of inhuman treatment, Art. 7(1)(k) ICCSt.); 'intentional infliction of conditions of life' (crime against humanity of extermination, Art. 7(2)(b) ICCSt.); 'intentional infliction of severe pain (crime against humanity of torture, Art. 7(2)(e) ICCSt.); 'intent of affecting the ethnic population' (crime against humanity of forced pregnancy, Art. 7(2)(f) ICCSt.); 'intention of maintaining that regime' (crime against humanity of apartheid, Art. 7(2)(h) ICCSt.); 'intention of removing them from the protection of law' (crime against humanity of enforced disappearance, Art. 7(2)(i) ICCSt.); 'intentionally directing attacks' (war crime of attack on civilian population, civilian objects, protected buildings and humanitarian missions, Art. 8(2)(b)(i), (ii), (iii), (ix), (xxiv) and (e)(i), (ii), (iii), (iv) ICCSt.); 'intentionally launching an attack' (war crime of disproportionate damage, Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) ICCSt.); 'intentionally using starvation' (war crime of starvation of civilians, Art. 8 (2)(b)(xxv) ICCSt.).
93. '[W]ilful killing' (war crime of killing, Art. 8(2)(a)(i) ICCSt); 'wilfully causing great suffering' (war crime of causing great suffering, Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) ICCSt.); 'wilfully depriving a... protected person of the rights of a fair and regular trial' (war crime of deprivation of the right to a fair trial, Art. 8(2)(a)(vi) ICCSt.); 'wilfully impeding relief supplies' (war crime of starvation of civilians, Art. 8(2)(b)(xxv) ICCSt.).
94. '[D]estruction...carried out unlawfully and wantonly' (war crime of destruction and appropriation of property, Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) ICCSt.).
95. Additional examples of subjective characteristics in the ICC Statute are: 'should have known', Art. 28(a)(i) ICCSt.; 'for the purpose of'; Art. 25(3)(c) ICCSt.; 'killing or wounding treacherously', Art. 8(2)(b)(xi) and (e)(ix) ICCSt.
96. Similarly, see Ambos, supra note 5, at 797 et seq.
97. Eser, supra note 5, at 901.
98. It would be too general to see the use of 'intentional(ly)' in the Statute as merely a declaratory confirmation of the general requirement of intent, but see, in this sense, Piragoff, supra note 15, at marginal no. 12
99. T. Weigend, 'Zur Frage eines "internationalen" Allgemeinen Teils', in B. Schünemann et al. (eds), Festschrift für Claus Roxin (Berlin: de Gruyter; 2001) 1375-1399, at 1389, footnote 57
100. see also Kelt and von Hebel, supra note 17, at 33.
101. Clark, supra note 5, at 313 et seq.
102. E.g. Art. 6(e), no. 6, Elements of Crimes (genocide by forcible transfer of children); Art. 8(2)(b)(vii), Sp. 1, 2, 4, no. 3, Elements of Crimes (war crime of improper use of insignia); Art. 8(2)(e)(vii), no. 3, Elements of Crimes (war crime of use of child soldiers).
103. Here, the wording is often used: 'The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established...', e.g. referring to 'the gravity of the conduct' (Art. 7(1)(e), no. 3, Elements of Crimes; crime against humanity of deprivation of liberty); 'the character of the act' (Art. 7(1)(k), no. 3, Elements of Crimes; crime against humanity of inhumane treatment); '[the] protected status [of the victim]' and 'the existence of an armed conflict' (Art. 8(2)(a)(i), nos 3 and 5, Elements of Crimes; war crime of killing. A large number of other Elements of Crimes for war crimes are consistent with this).
104. E.g. Art. 8(2)(b)(i), (ii) and (iii), Elements of Crimes, in each case, no. 3 (war crimes through attack on nonmilitary targets); Art. 8(2)(b)(xvi), no. 2, Elements of Crimes (war crime of plundering); Art. 8(2)(b)(xxiii), no. 2, Elements of Crimes (war crime of using human shields).
105. E.g. Art. 8(2)(b)(vii), Sp. 1, no. 2, Elements of Crimes (war crime of improper use of a flag of truce); Art. 8 (2)(b)(xii), no. 2, Elements of Crimes (giving no quarter).
106. See the examples in Werle, supra note 1, at marginal nos 322, 334, 613, 676 and 878,
107. and infra notes 100 et seq. and accompanying text.
108. Pro, see Cassese, supra note 3, at 176
109. Clark, supra note 5, at 321
110. Kelt and von Hebel, supra note 17, at 29 et seq.
111. Piragoff, supra note 15, at marginal no. 14
112. M. Politi, 'Elements of Crimes', in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. R. W. D. Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 443-473, at 461.
113. Contra, see Ambos, supra note 5, at 789 ('deviations from Art. 30 can only arise directly from Art. 6-8');
114. Eser, supra note 5, at 898 and 933
115. Weigend, supra note 10, at 326 et seq.
116. For details and for the status of Art. 21 as the authoritative rule on the sources of international criminal law, see Werle, supra note 1, at marginal nos 164 et seq.
117. Editor's emphasis.
118. See Weigend, supra note 10, at 327.
119. See Werle, supra note 1, at marginal nos 128 et seq.
120. See Werle, supra note 1, at marginal no. 127.
121. See also Weigend, supra note 10, at 327.
122. See Ambos, supra note 5, at 774
123. Weigend, supra note 51, at 1389, footnote 57
124. Werle, supra note 1, at marginal no. 326.
125. See Kelt and von Hebel, supra note 17, at 21.
126. On the customary international-law standard of the mens rea of superior responsibility, see ICTY, Judgment, Mucić et al. (IT 96-21-A), Appeals Chamber, 20 February 2001, §241
127. and K. Keith, 'The Mens Rea of Superior Responsibility as Developed by the ICTY jurisprudence', 14 Leiden Journal of International Law (2001) 617-634.
128. See J. Allain and J. R. W. D. Jones, 'A Patchwork of Norms: A Commentary on the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind', 8 European Journal of International Law (1997) 100-117, at 106
129. Eser, supra note 5, at 899.
130. For more on recklessness, 155 see infra note 94 and accompanying text,
131. and Werle, supra note 1, at marginal no. 330.
132. Whether this reduction affects all violations of international humanitarian law punishable as grave breaches has not yet been definitively determined; for discussion, see Werle, supra note 1, at Marginal nos 857 et seq.
133. from the inconsistent jurisprudence of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, see on the one hand ICTY, judgment, Blaškić (IT 95-14-T), Trial Chamber, 3 March 2000, §152 ('the mens rea constituting all the violations of Article 2 of the Statute includes both guilty intent and recklessness which may be likened to serious criminal negligence'), and §181
134. (but note that the decision of the Trial Chamber has been overruled in significant parts by the Judgment of the Appeals Chamber (IT 95-14-A), 29 July 2004, §§ 34 et seq.);
135. on the other hand, ICTY, Judgment, Aleksovski (IT95-14/1-T), Trial Chamber, 25 June 1999, §56
136. ('Recklessness cannot suffice') and ICTY, Judgment, Vasiljević (IT-98-32-T), Trial Chamber, 29 November 2002, §194.
137. But Eser, supra note 5, at 899, is incorrect when he states that the addition of 'wilful' is supposed to constantly increase the subjective requirements.
138. For details, see infra notes 100 et seq. and accompanying text.
139. For details, see infra notes 100 and 101 and accompanying text,
140. and Werle, supra note 1, at marginal nos 334, 613, 676 and 878.
141. See infra notes 100 et seq. and accompanying text.
142. See also Ambos, supra note 5, at 789 et seq.
143. See K. Ambos, 'Some Preliminary Reflections on the Mens Rea Requirements of the Crimes of the ICCSt. and of the Elements of Crimes', in L. C. Vohrah et al. (eds), Man's Inhumanity to Man, Essays on International Law in Honour of Antonio Cassese (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003) 11-40, at 18 et seq.
144. J. van der Vyver, 'Prosecution and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide'; Fordham International Law Journal (1999) 286-356, at 308.
145. This is also clearly warranted by the jurisprudence of the Tribunals, summarized by C. Aptel, 'The Intent to Commit Genocide in the Case Law of The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda', 13 Criminal Law Forum (2002) 273-291, at 277 et seq.
146. R. Arnold, 'The Mens Rea of Genocide Under the Statute of the International Criminal Court', 14 Criminal Law Forum (2003) 127-151, at 138 et seq.
147. But see O. Triffterer, 'Genocide: Its Particular Intent to Destroy in Whole or in Part the Group as Such', 14 Leiden Journal of International Law (2001) 399-408, at 404 et seq.
148. For the 'specific intent to discriminate', see ICTY, Judgment, Blaškić (IT-95-14-A), Appeals Chamber, 29 July 2004, §164
149. see also Werle, supra note 1, at marginal nos 745 et seq.
150. Additional examples in Kelt and von Hebel, supra note 17, at 32.
151. For the context element, see supra notes 28 et seq. and accompanying text
152. and Werle, supra note 1, at marginal no. 278.
153. For details, see Ambos, supra note 5, at 774 et seq.
154. Kelt and von Hebel, supra note 17, at 34 et seq.
155. See, e.g. L. Sadat, The International Criminal Court and the Transformation of International Law (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers, 2002) 208, footnote 140 ('jurisdictional requirements').
156. See also Weigend, supra note 51, at 1389, footnote 57.
157. See Weigend, supra note 10, at 327 et seq.
158. In the Elements of Crimes for the different subcategories of crimes, this requirement is consistently clarified such that 'the perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population'. This requirement, however, is immediately qualified by underlining that the requirement 'should not be interpreted as requiring proof that the perpetrator had knowledge of all characteristics of the attack or the precise details of the plan or policy of the State or organization. In the case of an emerging widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, the intent clause of the last element indicates that this mental element is satisfied if the perpetrator intended to further such an attack'. See Art. 7, Introduction, Elements of Crimes. The legal situation under the Statute corresponds to the customary law;
159. see ICTY, Judgment, Tadić (IT-94-1-T), Trial Chamber, 7 May 1997, § 656 ('perpetrator must know of the broader context');
160. see also H. Vest, 'Humanitätsverbrechen: Herausforderung für das Individualstrafrecht?', 113 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (2001) 457-498, at 475.
161. See also Clark, supra note 5, at 315
162. and Werle, supra note 1, at marginal no. 669.
163. See Weigend, supra note 10, at 328.
164. See Ambos, supra note 5, at 778 et seq.
165. Eser, supra note 5, at 928 et seq.
166. This requirement is further clarified in three ways: 'There is no requirement for a legal evaluation by the perpetrator as to the existence of an armed conflict or its character as international or non-international; in that context there is no requirement for awareness by the perpetrator of the facts that established the character of the conflict as international or non-international; there is only a requirement for the awareness of the factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict that is implicit in the terms, took place in the context of and was associated with.'; see Art. 8, Elements of Crimes.
167. See also Ambos, supra note 73, at 32.
168. For details, see Werle, supra note 1, at marginal nos 606 et seq.
169. The Elements of Crimes state explicitly: 'Notwithstanding the normal requirement for a mental element provided for in article 30, and recognizing that knowledge of the circumstances will usually be addressed in proving genocidal intent, the appropriate requirement, if any, for a mental element regarding this circumstance will need to be decided by the Court on a case-by-case basis.'
170. See also Clark, supra note 5, at 326
171. and Werle, supra note 1, at marginal no. 609.
172. For the meaning of the term 'intention', see supra note 13.
173. On the similarities and differences between dolus eventualis and recklessness, see Weigend, supra note 6, at 688 et seq. Some authors place recklessness and dolus eventualis on the same level of culpability;
174. see, e.g. B. Huber, 'Alleinhandeln und Zusammenwirken aus englischer Sicht', in A. Eser et al. (eds), Einzelverantwortung und Mitverantwortung im Strafrecht (Freiburg i.Br.: Ed. iuscrim, 1998) 79-91, at 80
175. D. Neressian, 'The Contours of Genocidal Intent', 37 Texas International Law Journal (2002) 231-276, at 263
176. see also ICTY, Judgment, Stakić (IT-97-24-T), Trial Chamber, 31 July 2003, §587. Others locate recklessness closer to an aggravated modality of negligence common to civil-law systems ('bewusste Fahrlässigkeit');
177. see, e.g. G. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 443
178. for a similar view, see ICTY, Judgment, Blaškić (IT-95-14, Trial Chamber, 3 March 2000, §152 ('recklessness which may be likened to serious criminal negligence').
179. For discussion of the various requirements of dolus eventualis, see H.-H. Jescheck and T. Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts, Allgemeiner Teil (5th edn, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot,1996) 299 et seq.
180. See, e.g. s. 2.02(2)(c) MPC: 'A person acts recklessly...when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element [of the offense] exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.';
181. see W. LaFave, Criminal Law (3rd edn, St Paul: West, 2000) 246 et seq., at 254. See also s. 18(c) of the Draft Criminal Code Bill (1989): A person acts "recklessly" with respect to (i) a circumstance when he is aware of a risk that it exists or will exist; (ii) a result when he is aware of a risk that it will occur; and it is in the circumstances known to him, unreasonable to take the risk.'
182. For advocates of inclusion of dolus eventualis, see H.-H. Jescheck, 'The General Principles of International Criminal Law Set Out in Nuremberg, as Mirrored in the ICC Statute', 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2004) 38-55, at 45
183. G.-J. Knoops, Defenses in Contemporary International Criminal Law (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers, 2001) 11 et seq.
184. F. Mantovani, 'The General Principles of International Criminal Law: The Viewpoint of a National Criminal Lawyer', 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2003) 26-38, at 32
185. Piragoff, supra note 22, at marginal no. 22
186. for a more nuanced view, see Eser, supra note 5, at 932 et seq.
187. against inclusion, see Ambos, supra note 5, at 804
188. C. Kreß, 'Römisches Statut des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofes', in H. Grützner and P. Pötz (eds), Internationaler Rechtshilfeverkehr in Strafsachen, Vol. 4 (2nd edn, Heidelberg: R.v. Decker, 2002), Vor III 26, marginal no. 52
189. Sadat, supra note 78, at 208 et seq.
190. W. Schabas, Introduction to the International Criminal Court (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 86
191. Weigend, supra note 51, at 1390, footnote 58.
192. Article 29(4) Draft ICCSt. (1998) states: 'For the purposes of this Statute and unless otherwise provided, where this Statute provides that a crime may be committed recklessly, a person is reckless with respect to a circumstance or a consequence if: (a) the person is aware of a risk that the circumstance exists or that the consequence will occur; (b) the person is aware that the risk is highly unreasonable to take; [and] [(c) the person is indifferent to the possibility that the circumstance exists or that the consequence will occur.]' The concept of dolus eventualis disappeared from the written documents even before the start of the Rome conference;
193. see Clark, supra note 5, at 301.
194. Though this is apparently the view of K. Ambos, 'General Principles of Criminal Law in the Rome Statute, 10 Criminal Law Forum (1999) 1-32, at 21.
195. See also Schabas, supra note 5, at 420.
196. See also Weigend, supra note 10, at 326 et seq.
197. Eser, supra note 5, at 945 et seq.
198. See ICTY, Judgment, Mucić et al. (IT-96-21-T), Trial Chamber, 16 November 1998, §439
199. see also Werle, supra note 1, at marginal no. 878.
200. See ICTY, Judgment, Kupreškić et al. (IT-95-16-T), Trial Chamber, 14 January 2000, §561
201. ICTR, Judgment, Musema (ICTR-96-13-T), Trial Chamber, 27 January 2000, §215 ('At the time of the killing the Accused or a subordinate had the intention to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm on the deceased having known that such bodily harm is likely to cause the victim's death, and is reckless as to whether or not death ensues').
202. See also Werle, supra note 1, at marginal no. 676.
203. See ICTY, Judgment, Tadić (IT-94-1-A), Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999, §§ 227 et seq.
204. Cassese, supra note 3, at 169.
205. ICTY, Judgment, Blaškić (IT-95-14-A), Appeals Chamber, 29 July 2004, §§ 34 et seq.
206. ICTY, Judgment, Blaškić (IT-95-14-A), Appeals Chamber, 29 July 2004, §42.
207. ICTY, Judgment, Stakić (IT-97-24-T), Trial Chamber, 31 July 2003, § 587.
208. ICTY, Judgment, Stakić (IT-97-24-T), Trial Chamber, 31 July 2003, § 587.
209. ICTY, Judgment, Stakić (IT-97-24-T), Trial Chamber, 31 July 2003, § 642.
210. ICTY, Judgment, Kayishema and Ruzindana (ICTR-95-1-T), Trial Chamber, §146.
211. See also van Sliedregt, supra note 5, at 49.